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JUST FEE SHIFTING 
ISSACHAR ROSEN-ZVI*
ABSTRACT
 Equal justice in present-day America is a myth. Millions are essentially blocked from 
accessing the civil justice system. A central factor in this predicament is the fees charged by 
attorneys, whose prohibitive rates prevent many Americans from asserting their legal rights. 
In order to ensure equal justice, it is, therefore, essential that measures be devised to counte-
ract the effect of attorney fees on access to justice for low- and average-income individuals. 
While the civil justice system offers a variety of mechanisms designed to offset the effect of 
wealth disparities on access to justice (such as legal aid, fee-shifting statutes, and contin-
gency fee arrangements), even when taken together, they are far from a sufficient remedy for 
the system’s ills.  
 This Article presents a novel solution to this problem. It proposes to replace the rule cur-
rently used for allocating attorney fees—the American Rule—with a progressive one-way fee-
shifting rule as a means of equalizing justice in civil litigation and assisting people of mod-
est means in financing litigation against wealthy adversaries. The proposed rule combines 
features from both the American Rule (whereby each party is responsible for its own attorney 
fees) and the English Rule (under which the loser pays the winner’s fees) in a way that takes 
into account resource disparities between the litigating parties. Accordingly, in litigation be-
tween unbalanced parties, the rule would direct courts to award attorney fees to the winner 
when the poor litigants prevail against their moneyed opponents (whether private corpora-
tions or governmental agencies), whereas each party would pay its own fees whenever the 
rich party prevails.  
 The Article argues that the progressive fee-shifting rule should appeal not only to people 
seeking a more egalitarian society, but also to those who care only about efficiency. By res-
toring the balance of power between the parties, the proposed rule resolves the inefficiencies 
that characterize the current system of civil justice. The most noteworthy and laudable 
probable effect of the rule would be the expansion of the legal services market to cover cur-
rently excluded types of claims. Like the contingency fee, the proposed rule would tap the 
forces of the legal services market by providing high quality lawyers economic incentive to 
accept less wealthy clients on a no-win, no-fee basis. At the same time, the proposed rule 
overcomes the two most serious drawbacks of contingency fees. First, in contrast to the con-
tingency fee market, which can only function if there are damages from which lawyers can 
collect fees, the proposed rule would bring into the legal services market a wide array of cas-
es not suited to the contingency arrangement, such as small meritorious claims, nonmoneta-
ry claims, and cases in which the defendant is the poor party. Second, under the contingency 
fee system, poor plaintiffs are left undercompensated because a large proportion of the recov-
ery is siphoned off as attorney fees. By shifting payment of the fees to the wealthy party, the 
proposed rule would ensure that the poor party is compensated for its entire loss. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Equal justice in present-day America is nothing more than a 
myth. For millions of people, access to the civil justice system is vir-
tually blocked.1 And while many others are formally able to access 
the system, their prospects of success in litigation are somewhere be-
tween slim and nonexistent.2 This is true not only for the indigent, 
but also for middle-class Americans who struggle to bear the rising 
costs of litigation.3 Over the years, funding legal services has become 
a daunting task, and those unable to shoulder it are by and large left 
to fend for themselves, usually unsuccessfully. Thus, we tolerate a 
system of justice in which money talks and, all too often, it speaks 
much louder than merit.4
 Contributing to this dismal state of affairs is the adversarial na-
ture of adjudication. The adversarial model is premised upon the idea 
that the best method for dispute resolution is reliance on the parties 
to produce the facts and present legal arguments.5 The rationale un-
derlying this model is that competition between opposing parties 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1785 (2001).  
 2. See Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
303, 304 (1988); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). 
 3. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004) (“According to most estimates, 
about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of 
middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a 
Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in 
Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1811-17 (1986) (criticizing the increase in attorney fees 
and exploring the unmet legal needs of the less well-to-do); David Luban, Taking Out the 
Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 213 
(2003) (arguing that “95% of low-income people’s legal needs remain unaddressed”). 
 4. Rhode, supra note 1, at 1786; see generally Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial 
Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and 
Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (2000) (arguing that there is a need for 
increased regulation and guidance for judges when awarding attorney fees in mass tort 
litigation to ensure equitable justice and equal access to the courts for low-income litigants).  
 5. William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1865, 1873 (2002). 
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leads to the triumph of truth.6 However, a fundamental prerequisite 
for such a system to function properly is that the competition take 
place between fairly matched adversaries7—parties that are some-
what equally capable of collecting evidence, examining witnesses, 
summoning experts, and the like. Thus, the accuracy of the judicial 
outcome is contingent on the absence of an a priori structural bias in 
favor of one of the parties.8 “If, due to a lack of resources, one party is 
unable to uncover evidence or is less skilled in developing legal ar-
guments, the outcome might be skewed in favor of her better-
equipped adversary.”9 This sums up the reality of the American civil 
justice system. Those with greater resources often win at trial not on 
merit, but because they can afford greater amounts of high quality 
legal assistance, which significantly impacts the persuasiveness of 
their cases.10 Therefore, it is essential for the administration of jus-
tice to neutralize, to whatever extent possible, resource disparities 
between parties and create a relatively level playing field between 
them. Otherwise, the justice system is plainly unjust.11
 But a legal system that fails to provide equal access to justice does 
not only pay the price of impairment of justice; it also pays in the 
hard currency of inefficiency, suboptimal deterrence, and diminished 
overall legitimacy and acceptability.12 A system that prevents or dis-
courages civil litigants from pursuing meritorious claims due to a 
lack of resources is not only unfair but also deficient from a social 
welfare perspective. First of all, it provides distorted incentives for 
large private firms and governmental agencies to take inadequate 
precautions against the many risks they create13 and to engage in un-
                                                                                                                                       
 6. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 382-85 (1978). 
 7. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494, 513 (1986). 
 8.  See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1874 (arguing that equality is important because, 
among other things, it contributes to accurate dispute resolution). For an exploration of the 
importance of accuracy for the effectiveness of the civil justice system, see Louis Kaplow,
The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 307-
08 (1994) (“Accuracy is a central concern with regard to a wide range of legal rules. One 
might go so far as to say that a large portion of the rules of civil . . . procedure and rules of 
evidence involve an effort to strike a balance between accuracy and legal costs.”). 
 9. Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L.
REV. 79, 91 (2008). 
 10. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 258 (2004) 
(“Given that the quality of representation depends on the ability to pay, current civil 
procedure doctrine would seem to provide a systemic distribution of the risk of error in 
favor of those who have the greatest share of social resources.”). 
 11. Luban, supra note 3, at 209, 220-21. For a philosophical exploration of the notion 
“justice” in the adversary system and its relationship to equality, see Wertheimer, supra note 2. 
 12. For that reason, the aspiration for equality in litigation exists even in systems 
that, and among people who, “condone[] gross disparities of wealth and . . . [are] resistant 
to redistributive financial policies . . . .” Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1874-75.    
 13. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 397 (2004); 
see also Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for Low-Income 
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lawful conduct that is beneficial to them but harmful to society at 
large.14 Moreover, since law is a public good, a suit that ends in a 
judicial resolution often not only serves the litigants at hand but also 
spills over to many other parties.15 These benefits are lost in a system 
that virtually blocks access to justice for a growing segment of the 
population. What is more, a legal regime that does not guarantee to
all individuals that their claims of injustice will be heard sends a 
message of disrespect and reinforces their sense of unworthiness.16 As 
a consequence, the unequal access to justice yields a loss of legitima-
cy for the entire civil justice system and diminishes the acceptability 
of its adjudicative outcomes.17
 The factor that contributes the most to this inequality in access is 
the prohibitively high attorney fees, which continue to increase year-
ly.18 This financial burden prevents more and more Americans from 
realizing their legal rights. Either they cannot afford to access the 
                                                                                                                                       
Litigants, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (1988) (asserting that it is impossible for a legal 
system to provide adequate levels of deterrence unless potential injurers are faced with the 
prospect of liability for the expected costs of their conduct). 
 14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 585 (6th ed. 2003) (“The 
likelier a suit is, the greater is the deterrence effect . . . and hence the less likely are 
potential defendants to engage in the forbidden conduct that would create a right to sue.”); 
Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1813 (arguing that “as potential wrongdoers gain confidence 
that their potential victims will not seek legal redress, the economic disincentive to the 
violation of rights fades and disappears”); see also Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way 
Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2058-69 (1993) (arguing that due to insurmountable 
obstacles to litigation standing in the way of the less affluent, the current system of civil 
justice fails to deter public and private actors from engaging in wrongdoings). 
 15. Such a suit could, for example, set a precedent that enables similar disputes to be 
resolved without resort to a full trial, thus saving society considerable resources. For 
example, a consumer might not contest a small erroneous or unlawful charge imposed by a 
financial institution due to the high litigation costs she would have to bear. Not only is the 
result unfair, it has detrimental external effects as well because many other consumers of 
that same institution might have gained from a judicial determination that the charge was 
unlawful or erroneous. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
131-32 (1985) (discussing the value of information produced by a lawsuit, which enables 
other disputants to settle their disputes without litigation); cf. POSNER, supra note 14, at 
553-54 (discussing the body of precedents as a capital stock).  
 16. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to 
Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172 (arguing that the opportunity to 
litigate promotes self respect and a sense of having your voice heard); Alschuler, supra note 
3, at 1810 (arguing that by enabling litigation, courts reinforce a sense of individual self-
worth and entitlement); RHODE, supra note 3, at 9 (arguing that access to justice “affirms a 
respect for human dignity and procedural fairness that are core democratic ideals”).  
 17. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 59 (quoting REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND 
THE POOR (1919), who argued that “injustice leads directly to contempt for law, [and] 
disloyalty to the government, and plants the seeds of anarchy”). 
 18. According to the Statistical Abstracts of the United States, in 2005, legal services 
amounted to approximately 1.45% of gross domestic production. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 430-31 tbls. 647 & 648 (127th ed. 2007), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/income.pdf. In comparison, 
twenty-five years earlier, in 1980, legal services accounted for approximately 0.85% of the GDP. 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 426 tbl. 691 
(110th ed. 1990), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1990-01.pdf. 
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system at all or the gross imbalances in the quality and quantity of 
legal representation significantly increase the risk of erroneous de-
privation of the poor party’s substantive rights.19 Therefore, to restore 
equal justice, it is essential that measures be taken to counteract the 
effect of attorney fees on the ability of low- and middle-income indi-
viduals to access the civil justice system and enable them to partici-
pate in litigation on equal terms with the more well-to-do. 
 The civil justice system offers a range of mechanisms for neutra-
lizing the effect of gross societal wealth disparities on the ability of 
the underprivileged to access justice. The best known of these is legal 
aid.20 Both the federal and state governments supply legal assistance 
to qualified poor people through different publicly funded programs, 
the biggest and most important being the Legal Services Corpora-
tion.21 Fee-shifting statutes, also known as Equal Access to Justice 
Acts, are another means by which government assists the poor in 
funding meritorious suits.22 Most of these statutes employ a one-way 
fee shift, under which plaintiffs that successfully sue a governmental 
agency or a large corporation can recover their attorney fees.23 There 
are also market-based mechanisms designed to assist the poor in fi-
nancing litigation. One such mechanism is a “no-win, no-pay” fee ar-
rangement, of which the contingency fee is the most commonly ap-
plied.24 Another market mechanism, which is used extensively in the 
United Kingdom and Continental Europe and to a much lesser extent 
in the United States, is legal expenses insurance.25 Under this me-
chanism, parties are insured for the costs of bringing or defending 
against legal actions.26
 Unfortunately, none of these mechanisms constitutes a satisfacto-
ry solution to the problem. The overall impact of all the publicly-
                                                                                                                                       
 19. Solum, supra note 10, at 258. 
 20. For a detailed discussion of legal aid, see infra Part II.A. 
 21. Luban, supra note 3, at 220; see generally Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2996 (2006).  
 22. For a detailed discussion of these fee-shifting statutes, see infra Part II.C. 
 23. See generally HENRY COHEN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’
FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES (updated June 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-970.pdf (discussing how awards of attorney fees are 
“designed to help to equalize contests between private individual plaintiffs and corporate or 
governmental defendants”); see also Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice From 
State “Equal Access to Justice Acts”?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 550 (1995). 
 24. For a detailed discussion of contingency fees, see infra Part II.B.; Herbert M. 
Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical 
Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1974-78 (2002).  
 25. Richard Able, Forecasting Civil Litigation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 447 (2009). 
 26. Due to its negligible presence in the United States, this measure will not be 
discussed in Part II of the Article but will be explored at some length in Part IV. There are 
also a host of mechanisms designed to aggregate claims such as multidistrict litigation and 
class actions. The Article does not deal with such mechanisms at all but focuses only on the 
many cases that cannot be aggregated and thus are handled individually.  
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funded programs and fee-shifting statutes on access to justice has 
been limited at best, while “the strength of our societal commitment 
to them has been underwhelming.”27 Adding insult to injury, legal aid 
programs are under constant, vicious attack.28 In fact, history has 
taught us two important lessons: first, programs that rely on public 
funds and the good will of the government are doomed to chronic un-
derfunding. There are always, allegedly, better uses for that money 
than to “throw it away” on helping the poor to litigate.29 Second, the 
best way to help the disadvantaged is to harness market forces and 
channel them to the poor’s advantage.30 Thus, it is imperative to de-
sign a market-driven mechanism that does not depend on public 
funds and provides for direct transfer of wealth between the litigat-
ing parties. The contingency fees represent one such mechanism, re-
lying on the market rather than on the government for its operation. 
Yet, as will be demonstrated below, this particular arrangement, 
which has proven to be by far the most successful available device for 
broadening access to justice, has solved the problem only partially 
and at a very high cost to low-income people.31
 This Article proposes an innovative arrangement for ensuring
equal justice and assisting those with modest means to finance litiga-
tion against wealthier and more powerful adversaries: a general, 
progressive one-way fee-shifting rule. The general progressive rule, a 
combination of the American and English Rules, is a mechanism for 
attorney fees allocation that takes into account resource disparities 
between parties to litigation. Under the American Rule, each party is 
responsible for its own attorney fees, regardless of the outcome, whe-
reas the English Rule instructs the losing party to pay the winner’s 
entire legal costs, including attorney fees.32 Under the proposed gen-
eral progressive rule, the arrangement governing attorney fee recov-
ery in any given case would be contingent on the relative economic 
power of the litigating parties. Based on their economic wherewithal, 
plaintiffs and defendants would be classified under the categories of 
“poor” and “rich.”33 In cases where both parties belong to the same 
category—either both “rich” or both “poor”—the American Rule 
would govern the fee award and each party would be responsible for 
its own attorney fees. The same rule would apply when only one of 
                                                                                                                                       
 27. Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1878. 
 28. Luban, supra note 3, at 209; see also RHODE, supra note 3, at 10 (reviewing the 
reasons for political opposition to legal services).  
 29. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 10. 
 30. Two such legal mechanisms are contingency fees, which will be discussed at 
length below, and class actions. See generally Resnik, supra note 4, at 2144-47. 
 31. See infra discussion at Part II.B; see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, 
Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law, Accessing Law, 39 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 691, 709 (2006). 
 32. Olson, supra note 23, at 549. 
 33. “Poor” and “rich” would be defined based on a formula discussed infra Part III.B. 
2010]                     JUST FEE SHIFTING 723 
the parties is classified as “rich” (whether plaintiff or defendant) and 
that party prevails in the litigation. When, however, the poor party 
prevails, the English Rule would apply and the rich party would be 
instructed to pay its opponent’s attorney fees.34
 This proposal can be deemed a progressive measure because it is 
socially and economically egalitarian.35 It is designed, first and fore-
most, to place low- and average-income earners on equal footing with 
the more well-to-do in litigation. However, it should also appeal to 
those who condone wealth disparities and resist redistributive policies. 
By restoring the balance of power between litigating parties, the pro-
posed mechanism resolves the inefficiencies that characterize the cur-
rent system of civil justice, brings deterrence to its optimal level, and 
restores the system’s overall legitimacy. This is achieved by expanding 
the market in legal services to cover many types of cases that are cur-
rently left outside the bounds of the economy of justice. The fee-
shifting rule proposed here encourages high quality (and, therefore, 
expensive) lawyers to take on the meritorious claims of the nonweal-
thy, who cannot afford to pay their fees, on a no-win, no-fee basis. 
Even when there is no prospect of a cash award at the end of the trial, 
the attorneys know that if they win, the wealthy opponent will pay 
their fees. Frivolous claims, on the other hand, would not increase in 
number, since few lawyers would agree to bring such low-probability 
claims to court and put their own resources on the line. In fact, the 
same logic underlying the contingency fee lies at the foundation of the 
proposed rule, only it has two important advantages: one is that the 
proposed rule works in many cases where the contingency mechanism 
fails, such as when the weak party is the defendant and when the suit 
is nonmonetizable or only a small monetary award is at stake. The 
other is that the proposed rule leaves much more money in the pockets 
of poorer litigants and thereby promotes distributive justice. 
 The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the different 
mechanisms, both publicly-funded and market-based, that are cur-
rently employed to facilitate access to justice for low-income people. 
It explores legal aid programs, contingency fee arrangements, and 
fee-shifting statutes and shows that although to some extent these 
mechanisms do, indeed, improve access, they far from guarantee 
equal access to justice. Therefore, a more comprehensive solution is 
called for. This challenge is taken up in Part III, where a general 
progressive one-way fee-shifting rule is proposed as a way to ensure 
equal justice and assist individuals with modest means to finance lit-
igation against wealthy adversaries. It presents the many compo-
                                                                                                                                       
 34. For a comprehensive discussion of the general progressive one-way fee-shifting 
rule proposed here, see infra Part III. 
 35. Luban, supra note 3, at 210 n.1. 
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nents of the rule and explains its mode of administration as well as 
the lawyer’s compensation formula that would be adopted under it. 
Part IV then evaluates the proposed rule in light of its expected im-
pact on the various aspects of litigation as well as on ex ante subs-
tantive behavior. The effects of the rule are compared to those pro-
duced by the two existing ideal-type fee regimes—the American Rule 
and the English Rule—demonstrating the proposed rule’s superiority 
to both. This is followed by a discussion of the expected impact of the 
general progressive rule on the incidence of frivolous claims, overall 
litigation rate, and the probability of settlements. Lastly, this Part 
defends the proposed rule from possible criticism from the fairness 
perspective. Some closing remarks conclude the Article. 
II.   THE CURRENT STATE OF EQUAL JUSTICE IN THE CIVIL SYSTEM
 The fact that growing segments of the population have a need for 
some type of legal assistance in order to enforce their rights has not 
been entirely lost on federal and state decisionmakers. Indeed, cer-
tain measures have been instituted aimed at guaranteeing universal 
access to justice. In the following section, I survey and expose the 
flaws and inadequacies of three such central measures: legal aid, 
contingency fee arrangements, and fee-shifting statutes. All of these 
mechanisms were designed with the purpose of facilitating access to 
the civil justice system for low-income people, but as I shall demon-
strate below, each one presents serious problems.     
A.   Legal Aid  
 Legal aid programs are the main scheme through which the feder-
al and state governments sponsor and promote access to justice. 
There is no right to legal assistance in civil matters in the United 
States.36 As a result, both the existence and scope of public legal aid 
programs are dependent on the goodwill of federal and state govern-
ments. Government-subsidized legal assistance for the poor began 
only quite recently, in 1965, when the federal government first made 
public funds available for legal services through the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity (OEO).37 By 1968, legal aid programs were operat-
ing in almost every state, with the OEO funding full service local 
providers serving specific geographic areas in order to ensure univer-
                                                                                                                                       
 36. Rhode, supra note 1, at 1787-88. The Due Process Clause requires courts to appoint 
an attorney to litigants who cannot afford one, but this requirement has been construed so 
narrowly that, in fact, counsel is almost never required in civil cases. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (holding that due process did not require state-appointed 
counsel to represent a mother in a termination of parental rights proceeding). 
 37. ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2007), available at 
http://www.clasp.org/publications/legal_aid_history_2007.pdf.  
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sal access to the legal system.38 In 1974, Congress passed the Legal 
Services Corporation (LSC) Act, which created an independent legal 
services entity funded by Congress39 and entrusted with the dual 
mission of promoting equal access to justice and providing high quali-
ty civil legal assistance to low-income Americans.40 The LSC took 
over the OEO legal aid programs in 1975, leaving the delivery and 
support structure fundamentally unchanged but expanding the pro-
grams to every county in the United States.41
 While civil legal aid programs have improved the lives of the poor 
through sustained legal services advocacy, they have not come close 
to meeting the mounting legal needs of individuals in or near the 
economic margins. Indeed, recent studies have found that less than 
15% of these needs are being met in some states.42 Moreover, inade-
quate access to legal aid is a problem affecting not only the poor, but 
also many middle-income Americans who are being “similarly priced 
out of the legal process.”43 The reason for what has been called the 
“justice gap” can be traced primarily to grossly inadequate funding. 44
A major obstacle impeding the programs’ ability to provide quality 
legal assistance to the disadvantaged is insufficient resources.45 Gov-
ernment legal aid budgets are ludicrous, and rather than expanding, 
they have been significantly reduced; when adjusted for inflation, 
they currently stand at roughly half their 1980 levels.46 In the United 
                                                                                                                                       
 38. Id. at 11. 
 39. Id. at 22. The LSC is a private nonprofit corporation governed by a bipartisan 
board appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Each fiscal year, as part of 
the budget process, Congress appropriates money for the LSC and the LSC distributes 
grants to legal aid programs in all fifty states. LSC, What is LSC?, http://www.lsc.gov/ 
about/lsc.php (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 40. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2006). 
 41. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 37, at 22. According to the Project to Expand 
Resources for Legal Services (PERLS) of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants, the largest element of the legal aid system constitutes “the 138 programs 
that are funded and monitored by [the] LSC.” ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE 
UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE FOR 2007, 2 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/ 
site/publications/files/0373.pdf.  
 42. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL EQUAL JUSTICE FUNDING, THE WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL 
LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 25 (2003), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/ 
taskforce/CivilLegalNeeds.pdf (“Low-income people face more than 85 percent of their legal 
problems without help from an attorney.”); see also HOUSEMAN, supra note 37, at 8-9 
(reporting the findings of nine state studies conducted by the LSC between 2000 and 2005 
on low-income Americans).  
 43. RHODE, supra note 3, at 103. 
 44. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1-2 (2005), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC%20Justice%20Gap_Final_1001.pdf.  
 45. HOUSEMAN, supra note 41, at 9. 
 46. RHODE, supra note 3, at 106. For fiscal year 2010, Congress provided $420 million 
to the LSC.  LSC, LSC Sends Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request to Congress, (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.lsc.gov/press/updates_2010_detail_T259_R2.php. For fiscal year 1981, the LSC 
received $321 million. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 37, at 30. Accounting for inflation 
using an online inflation calculator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the value of the 
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States, only about $2.25 per capita in public funds are expended on 
civil legal assistance, which is utterly inadequate for the task.47 As a 
result, “legal services offices can handle less than a fifth of the needs 
of eligible clients and often are able to offer only brief advice, not the 
full range of assistance that is necessary.”48
 To add to this, Congress imposed draconian restrictions on public-
ly funded legal aid programs that have significantly curtailed their 
effectiveness. Restrictions on the use of federal funds have existed 
since the inception of government funded legal services. From the 
outset, Congress prohibited the channeling of federal funds to such 
sensitive political matters as military service, abortion, and school 
desegregation.49 Later on, it passed regulations further restricting le-
gal services.50 Federally funded legal aid programs are thus prec-
luded from engaging in advocacy and representation before legisla-
tive bodies as well as in administrative rulemaking proceedings. 51
They may not initiate, participate, or engage in any class action or 
seek attorney fees that are otherwise statutorily authorized.52 In ad-
dition, recipients of federal funds must reveal the identities of their 
clients as well as the facts of their cases in statements that are made 
available to various federal departments and agencies that monitor 
or audit the LSC’s activities. 53 The regulation that has likely been to 
the greatest detriment of these programs is “Congress’s prohibition 
on LSC recipients using their nonfederal funds for these prohibited 
activities.”54 Since many of the legal activities Congress prohibits are 
those most likely to help the poor, these restrictions have greatly de-
bilitated legal aid programs.55
 This discussion clearly illustrates the dismal state of civil legal 
aid. And though lately things have improved slightly, “the United 
States has a very long way to go in order to enable low-income per-
sons to access a system of civil legal assistance that will address their 
                                                                                                                                       
1981 budget today would be approximately $835 million. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 47. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 106. According to the most recent census, law is a 
$181 billion per year industry. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2008, supra note 
18. Of that amount, less than $1 billion a year are dedicated to delivering legal services to 
low-income people. Luban, supra note 3, at 211; HOUSEMAN, supra note 41, at 1-2. 
 48. RHODE, supra note 3, at 13. 
 49. Luban, supra note 3, at 221; RHODE, supra note 3, at 105. 




 54. Id.; see also Alan W. Houseman, Future Changes and Prospects for Legal Aid and 
Public Defender Organizations, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 557, 558-59 (2006); see also RHODE,
supra note 3, at 105; Luban, supra note 3, at 221-22.  
 55. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 105. 
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legal needs effectively.”56 Moreover, the public nature of government 
funded legal services makes them exceptionally vulnerable to adverse 
political pressure. These programs have amassed many highly in-
fluential opponents during their decades of operation, putting them 
in constant threat of being further restricted or even dried up. It 
would be, therefore, imprudent to rely on legal aid as the sole method 
for assisting the poor.  
B.   Contingency Fee Arrangements 
 A second mechanism that assists low- and middle-income people 
in accessing the civil justice system is contingency fee agreements. As 
a lawyer’s billing practice, this is a market-based mechanism and, 
thus, seemingly unconnected to the government. This is misleading, 
however, as the government played a central role in laying the legal 
foundations that enabled the creation of the contingency fee. In fact, 
up until the nineteenth century, contingency fee agreements were 
forbidden under the common law doctrine of champerty.57 Champerty 
occurs when someone who is not a party to a lawsuit (including the 
plaintiff’s attorney) supports a litigant in return for a share in the 
proceeds of a successful claim.58 This practice was (and still is) barred 
in England and the United States as contrary to public policy.59 It 
was said to jeopardize the objectivity and impartiality of attorneys by 
putting them in a conflict of interest between their own interests and 
their clients’ interests, thus undermining the integrity of the admin-
istration of justice.60 Secondly, it was criticized for stirring up useless 
and unjust litigation.61
 While these concerns about conflicts of interest and frivolous liti-
gation were by no means unfounded,62 in the early nineteenth cen-
                                                                                                                                       
 56. ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, THE FUTURE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES
(2005), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/future_legal_aid.pdf.  
 57. See PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 191-92 (1997). 
 58. Richard Moorhead, Conditional Fee Arrangements, Legal Aid and Access to 
Justice, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 471, 476-77 (2000). 
 59. Id. at 477. 
 60. Geoffrey Woodroffe, Loser Pays and Conditional Fees—An English Solution?, 37 
WASHBURN L.J. 345, 350 (1998). In England, as well as in many other European countries, 
contingency fee agreements are still forbidden by law. For a discussion of the development 
in England, see infra note 150. 
 61. KARSTEN, supra note 57, at 192. 
 62. I will discuss some of the criticisms of contingency fees that are applicable to my 
proposal later in the Article. For a critique of contingency fees, see, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 
24, at 1975 (describing the potential conflicts of interest between lawyers and clients that 
are inherent in contingency fee arrangements). See also LESTER BRICKMAN, MICHAEL 
HOROWITZ & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 28, 58, 80-81 (1994)
(arguing that in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest and ensure that lawyers 
accept settlements that are beneficial to their clients, when a defendant makes an early 
settlement offer that is rejected by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s lawyer would be permitted to 
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tury, American courts and legislatures started to permit contingency 
fee arrangements, and by 1850, the practice was permissible in most 
states.63 What accounted for this striking change of heart? How is it 
that a practice denounced for centuries as abusive, strife promoting, 
and against public policy became an acceptable, even laudable, prac-
tice within a few short decades? Peter Karsten argues that American 
judges and legislators consciously resolved to sanction contingency 
fee arrangements “in order to help a poor man to ‘sue for his right.’ ”64
Stephen Yeazell, in contrast, is more skeptical. He asserts that the 
transformation was not the product of “thoughtfully devised pro-
grams,” but rather should be attributed to “self-interest . . . combined 
with deregulation.”65 Whatever the case may be, it is undisputed that 
the endorsement of the contingency fee mechanism opened the doors 
of justice to indigent and lower-class plaintiffs who otherwise would 
have been unable to obtain legal services, let alone quality legal aid. 
Indeed, this legal innovation is aptly praised as “the individual’s key 
to the courthouse.”66
 The success of the contingency fee is, to a large extent, due to its 
ability to channel market forces to the advantage of the average per-
son.67 To understand this mechanism, it is essential to understand its 
economics.68 When attorneys take a case on a contingency-fee basis, 
they are acting as businesspeople. They assume the financing of the 
litigation, which could be quite costly both in time and resources, in 
return for a piece of the pie in the event that they win in court. How-
ever, attorneys risk losing their entire investment if they suffer de-
feat.69 Some cases are certainly a priori riskier than others, but there 
is always some uncertainty in every legal case; therefore, like any 
good investor, contingency fee lawyers tend to diversify their prac-
                                                                                                                                       
charge only an hourly rate on work done before the settlement offer plus a percentage of 
any recovery in excess of the offer).  
 63. KARSTEN, supra note 57, at 195-96. In fact, by that time, state and county officials 
were regularly employing lawyers on a contingency fee basis. Id. at 196. 
 64. Id. at 197. 
 65. Yeazell, supra note 31, at 704. 
 66. Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to the Courthouse Door,
LITIG., Summer 1976, at 27. 
 67. Id. at 29 (explaining that “the contingent fee offers to the client an opportunity to 
pool his resources with other plaintiffs represented by the same attorney”). In fact, legal rules 
sanctioning contingency fee arrangements were a necessary but insufficient condition for 
their success; it was the interaction of the new legal rules with developments in the business 
and financial organization of the legal practice that was responsible for the ascendancy and 
expansion of the contingency fee. Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 186 (2001). Yeazell points to the massive expansion of consumer credit 
and insurance that created a large pool of solvent defendants as an important factor in the 
explosion of the usage of contingency fee arrangements. Id. at 186-87.  
 68. See Yeazell, supra note 31, at 709-13. For an explanation of the economics of 
contingency fee arrangements, see, e.g., POSNER, supra note 14, at 584-85; Bruce L. Hay, 
Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997). 
 69. POSNER, supra note 14, at 584. 
2010]                     JUST FEE SHIFTING 729 
tice. As observed by Herbert Kritzer, “[t]he work of the contingency 
fee lawyer can best be viewed as the management of a portfolio of 
cases.” 70 While aspiring to win each and every case and thus achieve 
a positive return on every individual investment, realistically they 
seek a positive return on the portfolio as a whole.71 The risk contin-
gency fee lawyers bear in taking on cases on this basis creates a 
strong incentive for them to screen cases and turn down the riskier 
ones that are unlikely to generate any profit.72 This screening prac-
tice, which exists for the sole selfish purpose of making profit, none-
theless results in the weeding out of meritless claims from the system 
and thus serves social welfare.73 The genius of the contingency fee is 
that it yields better access to justice, a more level playing field, and 
even increased efficiency without spending one penny of public funds, 
simply by altering the market for legal services.74
 Despite its undeniable effectiveness as a litigation-enabling me-
chanism for the poor, the contingency fee still suffers from two signif-
icant shortcomings. The first is the high price tag contingency fee 
lawyers put on their services, which averages around one-third of the 
award but can get as high as 50%.75 There is no small amount of con-
troversy around whether the sizeable returns contingency fee law-
yers reap when they win are a justified reward for their willingness 
to bear the risk of absorbing the litigation expenses or an undeserved 
windfall.76 Whatever the case may be, the end result is the same: a 
                                                                                                                                       
 70. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE 
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2004).  
 71. Id.; see also Yeazell, supra note 31, at 704-05 (“By pooling the fortunes of plaintiff-
clients, contingent fee lawyers aggregate their risks and justify investment of their time 
and various out-of-pocket expenditures.”). 
 72. According to a survey of contingency fee lawyers in Wisconsin, they decline to 
assume representation in about half the cases brought to them. Moreover, for certain types 
of cases, such as medical malpractice, the vast majority are turned away. See Kritzer, 
supra note 24, at 1976. 
 73. The screening of cases is not without flaws. In some cases, contingency fee lawyers 
still undertake frivolous claims in the hope of forcing the defendant to agree to an early 
settlement so as to avoid paying litigation expenses. Id. at 1975. I will discuss the risk of 
frivolous litigation as it applies to my proposal as well at infra Part IV.A.2.  
 74. Yeazell, supra note 31, at 707.
 75. See, e.g., BRICKMAN, HOROWITZ & O’CONNELL, supra note 62, at 13-14 (arguing 
that contingency fees “seldom amount to less than one third” of recovery and that many 
lawyers get standard fees up to 50% for cases settled before trial); Lester Brickman, ABA 
Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 248 
(1996) (arguing that one-third or more is the standard contingency fee figure);. In a 
comprehensive survey, Herbert Kritzer found that in about 60% of the cases sampled, the 
contingency fee was one-third of the recovery. In about 31% of the cases, the fee structure 
employed was a variable percentage, which usually amounted to 20% to 43% of the 
recovery in cases that involved a lawsuit but not a trial and 25% to 50% for those getting to 
trial. KRITZER, supra note 70, at 39-40. 
 76. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk, 
and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and 
Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 426 (1998).  
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large portion of the recovery—often compensation for inflicted dam-
ages—goes into the lawyer’s pocket instead of the plaintiff’s. Thus, 
while poor plaintiffs are better off in a system that sanctions contin-
gency fees than in a system that does not, they are still inadequately 
compensated.77 The second limitation is that “[t]he contingent fee 
market only functions if there are damages from which attorneys can 
collect fees. If no money changes hands, nothing drives the market.”78
Excluded from the market, therefore, are many types of cases that 
are unsuited to this fee structure. Cases in which the defendant is 
poor comprise one such category. Defendants are unable to enjoy the 
benefits of the contingency fee scheme because there is never any ex-
pectation of a cash payment at the end of the trial: they either lose 
and pay damages or win and pay nothing.79 A second category is 
nonmonetary claims. Not all lawsuits result in money changing 
hands; many of them conclude in an order or injunction, such as cas-
es involving divorce, custody adjudication, income maintenance, and 
housing disputes.80 In such nonmonetizable claims, a litigant who 
lacks economic resources will not be able to hire a lawyer on a con-
tingency fee basis. Lastly, the contingency fee scheme is not suited to 
small meritorious claims. One-third of the award or recovery would 
be insufficient to attract a contingent fee lawyer if the sum of money 
at stake is too small, even when the claim is clearly meritorious.81 In-
deed, very few lawyers (and no high quality attorney) would accept a 
case on a contingency fee basis if the potential recovery were limited 
to $2000 or even $5000 because the maximum benefit they could reap 
would not be worth their while.  
 In sum, although the contingency fee system has clearly benefited 
low- and middle-income litigants, and thus the civil justice system as 
a whole, it is no panacea. Many categories of cases are unsuitable for 
this fee structure, and for cases that do fit, the contingency fee comes 
at a high price for the disadvantaged. It is essential, therefore, to 
                                                                                                                                       
 77. But see Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J. Saks & Stephan Landsman, Juror 
Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase 
Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1998) (arguing that jurors take wealth disparities 
into consideration when awarding damages).  
 78. Yeazell, supra note 31, at 709. 
 79. Some types of contingency fee arrangements can be used by defense lawyers, but 
they all involve defendants paying out of their own pockets and are therefore irrelevant for
low-income defendants. An example of such a fee arrangement would be agreeing on some 
target result for the litigation, with the lawyer receiving a percentage of any amount below
that target that the defendant would have to pay to resolve the case. KRITZER, supra note 
70, at 10; see also Robert E. Litan & Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client 
Relationship Through Alternative Billing Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191, 195-96 (1994).  
 80. These types of cases are by no means insignificant in number. Note, supra note 13, 
at 1235 (asserting that in 1981 housing and income maintenance disputes amounted to 
almost 36% of all cases handled by LSC lawyers). 
 81. See Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A 
Qualified Success, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 458, 496 (1993).  
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seek a mechanism that will bridge the “justice gap” unmediated by 
this arrangement. 
C.   Equal Access to Justice Acts 
 Fee shifting is the third mechanism that enables the poor to 
access the civil justice system. Various federal and state statutes au-
thorize courts to award attorney fees to private parties who prevail in 
litigation against federal and state agencies and, in certain cases, al-
so against corporate defendants. The general rule governing attorney 
fees in the United States is that each of the parties is liable for its 
own attorney fees. Under the American Rule, the prevailing party is 
ordinarily not entitled to collect attorney’s fee from the loser.82 There 
are, however, several statutory exceptions to this, under which feder-
al and state courts may order the losing party, in specific issues and 
under certain conditions, to pay the winning party’s fees and ex-
penses. These statutes are collectively known as Equal Access to Jus-
tice Acts (“EAJAs”).83
 The first comprehensive and best known fee-shifting statute was 
the Federal Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980,84 which marked a
departure from the almost exclusive reign of the American Rule in 
civil litigation.85 The 1980 Act authorized federal courts to award 
                                                                                                                                       
 82. Olson, supra note 23, at 549; Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814-
15 (1994). 
 83. See Olson, supra note 23, at 548, 555 n.37. 
 84. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). The EAJA 
was reenacted in 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
2412 (2006) and 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006)). For a complete legislative history, see Krent, supra 
note 81, at 458 nn.2, 3.   
 85. Prior to the enactment of the EAJAs, there were only two common law exceptions 
to the American Rule. One was the common benefit doctrine, under which  
the federal courts have authority to award attorneys’ fees from a fund to a 
party who, having a common interest with other persons, maintains a suit for 
the common benefit and at his own expense, resulting in the creation or 
preservation of a fund, in which all those having the common interest share.  
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 8 L.Ed.2d 894, 905 (1963). This exception, however, does not shift 
attorney fees to the losing party, but rather to the beneficiaries of the fund. The other 
common law exception to the American Rule is the bad faith exception, under which federal 
courts “may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted ‘in bad 
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’ ” Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). 
It should be noted, however, that these exceptions did not apply in cases against the 
United States due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, under which “the United States 
may not be sued, nor its funds expended, without its consent.” CRS REPORT, supra note 23, 
at 6. Another exception that existed, the Private Attorney General exception, provided that 
plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees if they effectuated a strong Congressional policy to 
the benefit of a large class of people. It was abolished by the Supreme Court in Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Congress responded to 
Alyeska by legislating the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 
1988(b), authorizing federal courts to shift reasonable attorney fees from a losing party to a 
prevailing party, other than the United States, in actions to enforce certain enumerated 
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reasonable attorney fees to certain prevailing private parties in all 
non-tort and non-tax civil litigation brought by or against the federal 
government, unless the government proves that its position was 
“substantially justified.”86 Numerous other statutes, at both the fed-
eral and state levels, followed suit, authorizing courts under circums-
tances specified in the statutes to instruct the government to reim-
burse the attorney fees of private parties prevailing in litigation 
against them. Congress also enacted a number of such one-way fee-
shifting statutes applying to the conduct of private businesses, in-
cluding the Truth in Savings Act,87 the Unfair Competition Act,88 the
Clayton Act,89 and Title VII.90 While it is hard to know precisely just 
how many fee-shifting provisions exist, as they are scattered 
throughout the books attached to pieces of substantive legislation, 
their numbers are estimated to be in the hundreds at the federal lev-
el and in the thousands at the state level.91
 Ironically enough, the legislative history of the Federal Equal 
Access to Justice Act, as well as that of various state EAJAs, reveals 
that when enacting these statutes into law, Congress and state legisla-
tures did not have the welfare of low-income individuals in mind. The 
principal intended beneficiaries were, in fact, small businesses: “it was 
a product of the deregulatory climate of the early 1980s, passed largely 
at the instigation of small businesses to help them defend themselves 
against allegedly unreasonable government regulation.”92 This ex-
plains the seemingly peculiar fact that the ACLU, the Committee for 
Civil Rights under Law, and the Council for Public Interest Law, along 
with other liberal interest groups advocating for the poor and the dis-
advantaged, initially opposed the 1980 federal Equal Access to Justice 
                                                                                                                                       
provisions protecting civil rights. However, Congress has never reversed Alyeska, and as a 
result, courts are authorized to award attorney fees only under specific statutes explicitly 
granting them this power and have no general authority to award attorney fees in cases 
brought under statutes that do not expressly provide for fee shifting.    
 86. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 
 87. 12 U.S.C. § 4310(a)(3), repealed by Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act 
1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-470 (1996). 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 72, repealed by Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 
2004, P. L. No. 108-249, 118 Stat. 2434 (2004). 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 
 91. For an updated list of the federal statutes that authorize awards of attorney fees, 
see CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 64-114. At the state level, a survey conducted by Susan 
Olson in 1993 estimated that the number of state fee-shifting statutes stood at about 4000. 
Olson, supra note 23, at 552. A different study estimates the number of fee-shifting 
statutes at more than 200 at the federal level and close to 2000 at the state level. David A. 
Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the 
“American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 588 (2005). 
 92. Olson, supra note 23, at 555; see also Root, supra note 91, at 549. In fact, some of the 
State EAJAs allow only businesses to make claims and not individual claimants. Id. at 555-
58; see also Susan Gluck Mezey & Susan M. Olson, Fee Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal 
Access to Justice Act, 77 JUDICATURE 13, 15 (1993); Krent, supra note 14, at 2042-43 n.22. 
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Act fearing that it would have a detrimental effect on the functioning
of the regulatory state. By 1985, however, these groups all joined small 
businesses in support of the legislation with the understanding that, 
notwithstanding the agenda that had led Congress to pass the Act, it 
could still be used to benefit the disadvantaged.93
 The public policy rationales underlying the EAJAs have been sub-
ject to debate. Harold Krent has suggested three central objectives 
that Congress may have sought. The first was minimizing the costs of 
monitoring the conduct of governmental agencies and private busi-
nesses by providing incentives to individuals and small businesses to 
challenge inappropriate behavior on the part of these entities, when 
such a challenge would not occur absent such incentives. The second 
possible goal was to deter subsequent wrongdoings by such bodies 
due to both improved judicial review and the increase in the cost of 
litigation that results from the obligation to pay the opposing party’s 
attorney fees. Third, proposed Krent, Congress sought to ensure 
“more complete compensation for parties injured by government 
wrongdoing or by the failure of private entities to comply with go-
vernmental directives.”94 Yet Krent acknowledged that these ratio-
nales could not fully account for the specific form the fee-shifting me-
chanism took in the EAJAs. It is unlikely, for instance, that compen-
sation for injured parties is a central objective of the Federal Act, due 
to both its narrow scope, which excludes all tort actions, and the fact 
that compensation extends only to individuals and businesses that 
meet certain eligibility standards. Under these standards, wealthy 
individuals and big businesses are never eligible to collect their at-
torney fees even when they prevail and the government’s position is 
not substantially justified.95 It is clear, therefore, that the EAJAs are 
in fact concerned with still another matter: facilitating the access of 
low-income people to the civil justice system and instituting a bal-
ance of power between the parties to the litigation96—in other words, 
promoting distributive justice.97 One-way fee shifting not only in-
creases the likelihood of challenges to inappropriate conduct by go-
vernmental agencies and big businesses, but it also gives such chal-
lenges teeth. By counterbalancing some of the advantages that big 
                                                                                                                                       
 93. Olson, supra note 23, at 555-56.  
 94. Krent, supra note 14, at 2044-45; see also Krent, supra note 81, at 458. 
 95. See Krent, supra note 81, at 477-78. According to Susan Olson’s study, most State 
EAJAs place some limits on eligibility. Restrictions based on the wealth of individuals 
range from a ceiling of only $50,000 in net worth in New York to $2 million in net worth in 
Missouri. For businesses, the ceilings on eligibility range from $1 million in annual gross 
receipts and no more than 20 employees in Iowa to as high as $7 million in net worth and 
500 employees in Missouri. Olson, supra note 23, at 561-62. 
 96. See Krent, supra note 81, at 462-67; see also Olson, supra note 23, at 548 (arguing 
that “EAJAs potentially make more equal the litigation resources of private parties and  
the government”).  
 97. See Krent, supra note 14, at 2074. 
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institutional entities enjoy in litigating against private parties and 
small businesses,98 one-way fee shifting enables the latter to engage 
in expensive protracted litigation that they could otherwise not af-
ford.99 These mechanisms are particularly beneficial for people of 
modest means in small meritorious claims and in nonmonetizable 
claims, for which contingency fees are not feasible.100 In these types of 
cases, “[p]arties with strong claims can use the prospect of the fee 
award to attract counsel to represent them.”101        
 Unfortunately, however, both the Federal and state EAJAs have 
had, at best, only limited success in meeting the goal of equal access 
to justice.102 Empirical studies confirm that “EAJAs have produced a 
rather modest degree of redistribution of resources from the govern-
ment to private parties.”103 The reason for this failure is twofold. 
First, as currently formulated with the variety of conditions and re-
strictions on fee recovery, EAJAs are ill-suited to redress the gross 
resource disparities between the government and big business and 
their smaller adversaries.104 Second, despite their seeming abun-
dance, the current fee-shifting statutes are not a sufficient means for 
providing the poor with meaningful access to justice—they are but a 
drop in the bucket.  
1.   The Debilitating Conditions and Restrictions in the EAJAs 
 The EAJAs were essentially stripped of their redistributive poten-
tial by the many restrictions and conditions written into them. This 
was arguably an attempt to strike a balance between antigovernment 
and antilitigation ideologies.105 The recovery of attorney fees under 
the majority of the EAJAs is not automatic. In order to collect the 
fees, private parties and small businesses must meet conditions that 
go beyond merely winning in court and are subject to numerous re-
strictions. These conditions and restrictions relate to many matters, 
                                                                                                                                       
 98. See generally Galanter, supra note 2, at 97 (arguing that the basic architecture of 
the American adversarial legal system accords institutional entities, such as big businesses 
and governmental agencies that frequent the civil justice system (“repeat players”), 
substantial advantages that enable them to fare much better in litigation than individuals 
and small businesses (“one-shotters”)). 
 99. Krent, supra note 14, at 2062.  
 100. Krent, supra note 81, at 465-66. Krent identifies three categories of claims in 
particular that could potentially benefit from one-way fee shifting. One is small 
meritorious claims, in which the high cost of litigation outweighs the amount that could be 
won, even when the chances of winning are very high. Second is claims that cannot be 
monetized, and third is targets of government enforcement efforts that should be 
encouraged to devote greater resources to litigation. 
 101. Krent, supra note 14, at 2050.
 102. Krent, supra note 81, at 466-67.
 103. Olson, supra note 23, at 549; see also Mezey & Olson, supra note 92, at 13-14. 
 104. See Krent, supra note 81, at 478 (arguing that the Federal EAJA’s attempt to 
equalize the strength of the parties to the litigation succeeds only at the margins). 
 105. Olson, supra note 23, at 549, 581. 
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including the standard for recovery, its mandatory or discretionary 
nature, the identities of the parties eligible to make claims, the 
amount of fees recoverable, and the type of legal actions covered.  
 One commonplace condition that is most detrimental from a redi-
stributive standpoint is the “substantial justification” standard. Un-
der many Federal and state EAJAs, parties cannot recover attorney 
fees unless they can show that the government’s position was not 
“substantially justified” or lacked “a reasonable basis.”106 A few sta-
tutes apply even more stringent standards, such as bad faith, frivo-
lousness, or groundlessness.107 The substantial justification standard 
requires the parties to engage in another round of onerous litigation, 
which becomes a repeat of the original underlying dispute. Prevailing 
parties who are eligible for the fee award must demonstrate that the 
government’s position was not only wrong, but that it was not 
grounded in either fact or law.108 To this end, they are forced to ana-
lyze, yet again, all of the factual and legal questions of the original 
case. This is a burdensome and costly procedure that entails the risk 
that they will eventually have to bear these additional costs them-
selves if the court finds the government’s position substantially justi-
fied. The prevalence of this standard, in one form or another, in al-
most every state and Federal EAJA has substantially diminished the 
overall redistributive effect of this legislation.109 Furthermore, many 
EAJAs do not simply mandate fee shifting whenever a party prevails 
in litigation against government or big business; rather, they author-
ize judges to award fees whenever they deem this appropriate.110
Such absolute discretion makes fee recovery much more tenuous and 
limits significantly the effectiveness of the EAJAs applying the me-
chanism.
                                                                                                                                       
 106. Krent, supra note 81, at 478; Olson, supra note 23, at 565. In Pierce v. Underwood, 
487 U.S. 552 (1988), the Supreme Court deemed the two standards equivalent; thus, I will 
refer from now on only to the “substantially justified” standard.  
 107. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711(1)(b) (1994); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 
2006.011(1), 2006.013(a)(3) (West 1995).  
 108. Krent, supra note 81, at 481. Under some of the statutes, the government bears 
the burden of proof to show that its conduct was substantially justified. Olson, supra note 
23, at 566. 
 109. Olson, supra note 23, at 581. The empirical research reveals that Arizona, one of 
the only states that does not condition fee recovery on a showing that the government’s 
position was not substantially justified or on any other similar standard, has far more fee 
award claims than any other state. This finding indicates that the substantial justification 
standard plays an important role in a party’s decision to claim attorney fees under the 
EAJAs. Id. at 567-68.  
 110.  See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (“In any judicial proceeding under this 
section, the court may award costs of litigation . . . whenever it determines that such an 
award is appropriate.”); see also Olson, supra note 23, at 553 (reporting a survey she 
conducted of all State EAJAs, according to which 54% of the fee-shifting provisions were 
mandatory, while 42% were discretionary and 4% unclear).  
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 Moreover, most EAJAs include some kind of limitation on eligibili-
ty to claim attorney fees, with many setting stringent restrictions. 
California, Louisiana, and Minnesota, for instance, exclude individu-
als as claimants under their fee-shifting statutes.111 In Tennessee, on-
ly businesses (not individuals) with thirty employees or fewer are eli-
gible for fee awards.112 Similarly, in Florida, eligibility is limited to 
businesses with no more than twenty-five employees and a net worth 
of two million dollars or less.113
 Another condition for fee recovery is the “prevailing party” stipu-
lation, which the Supreme Court has interpreted in a way that 
thwarts the egalitarian potential of the EAJAs.114 Under the various 
fee-shifting statutes, only the prevailing party is entitled to recover 
its attorney fees.115 The way courts construe success in litigation is 
therefore crucial to the scope and effectiveness of the statutes. In the 
beginning, the Court’s interpretation was quite promising. In Maher 
v. Gagne,116 the Court concluded that prevailing in litigation is not 
limited to entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the me-
rits; rather, it also includes a favorable settlement. The Court as-
serted that “[t]he fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement 
rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees.”117
Subsequent decisions, however, greatly weakened the redistributive 
impact of fee-shifting statutes. In Buckhannon,118 for example, the 
Supreme Court held that a party is not considered a “prevailing par-
ty” under the federal fee-shifting statutes without a judgment on the 
merits or a settlement approved by the court, even if the defendant 
voluntarily gives the plaintiff the sought-after relief.119 The result of 
this unfortunate ruling has been that the statutory fee-shifting me-
chanisms are now very easily manipulated. When facing defeat in lit-
igation, all the government or a big business has to do to circumvent 
liability for attorney fees (which could be considerable) is unilaterally 
                                                                                                                                       
 111. Olson, supra note 23, at 568. 
 112. Id.
 113. Id.
 114. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Adding Insult to No Injury: The Denial of Attor-
ney’s Fees to “Victorious” Employment Discrimination and Other Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 37 
FLA. ST. U. L REV. 49, 53-57 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Farrar v. 
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), and explaining how “[m]ost courts follow this rule and deny fee 
requests to [civil rights] plaintiffs who, despite being able to establish prevailing party sta-
tus are awarded only nominal damages”).  
 115. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
 116. 448 U.S. 122 (1980). 
 117. Id. at 129. 
 118. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598 (2001). 
 119. Id. at 605. Prior to Buckhannon, federal courts regularly awarded attorney fees in 
such cases under a principal known as the “catalyst theory,” according to which litigants 
are entitled to attorney fees if it was determined that their litigation was the catalyst for 
the sought-after relief. See CRS Report, supra note 23, at 15. 
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change its position and “voluntarily” give in to the opposing party’s 
demands in a way that makes the case moot.120
 Another restriction that undermines the ability of some EAJAs to 
level the litigating strength of the parties is a cap on the amount of 
fees that can be recovered under the statutes. Some of the statutes 
provide for the payment of “reasonable” attorney fees,121 with the 
court determining the exact amount, but place no extrinsic limit on 
them. Others, however, set a cap on either the hourly rate or the to-
tal recoverable amount. The Federal Equal Access to Justice Act, for 
instance, prescribes a cap of $125 for the maximum hourly rate small 
parties can collect from the government.122 Many state EAJAs follow 
the federal lead and cap the amount of fees recoverable, which is be-
low the going market rate in most cases.123
 In short, as currently structured, the Federal and state EAJAs 
“are by no means redistributive mechanisms . . . .”124 “With all these 
restrictions that reduce the ability of many prevailing parties to qual-
ify for an award of attorney fees, it is not surprising that most of the 
laws have not been heavily used.”125 If we truly wish to use the EA-
JAs as a framework for counteracting the imbalances in litigation re-
sources, some fundamental modifications are imperative.126
                                                                                                                                       
 120. See Luban, supra note 3, at 243. Yet another problematic Supreme Court decision, 
primarily affecting public interest lawyers, was Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). The 
case revolved around the lawfulness of a tactic called “sacrifice offer,” whereby the 
defendant offers a settlement granting the plaintiff full relief provided that the plaintiff 
waives his or her right to statutory attorney fees. Luban, supra note 3, at 241. In the Evans 
case, the legal aid lawyers representing the plaintiff advised him to accept the offer but 
later moved to have the fee waiver set aside as exploitation of their ethical obligation 
towards their clients and as undermining Congress’ intention to legislate fee-shifting 
statutes. The Court refused to set aside the waiver, reasoning that the plaintiff’s lawyers 
could fulfill their ethical obligation by foregoing their statutory fees. Id. While private 
lawyers can thwart such sacrifice offers by writing into the retainer agreement an 
undertaking on the part of the client to pay the attorney fees if he or she accepts such an 
offer, legal aid lawyers would risk their tax exempt status were they to do so. Id. at 242; 
Evans, 475 U.S. at 756-57 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 121. The “reasonable” attorney fees standard raises many convoluted questions. See, 
e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 114, at 53-55; Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney’s 
Fees Against the Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 (1993).  
 122. The cap was originally set at $75 per hour but was increased in March 29, 1996, to 
$125 per hour. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 
231-33, 110 Stat. 862-64. 
 123. Olson, supra note 23, at 564-65. 
 124. Id. at 579-80.
 125. Id. at 566.  
 126. Such modifications would include: rescinding the various restrictions on fee 
recovery, such as the “substantial justification” standard; making recovery automatic upon 
prevailing in litigation and subjecting it to only limited judicial review; extending “prevailing 
party” to cases in which the sought-after relief is granted “voluntarily” without any court 
order or consent decree; and increasing the recoverable fees to match market rates.  
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2.   But a Drop in the Ocean… 
 Even absent these conditions and restrictions, the EAJAs would 
not succeed at restoring equal justice. As noted above, there are over 
150 statutes containing a fee-shifting mechanism of some sort at the 
federal level and thousands of such statutes at the state level.127 This 
may sound like a lot, but as Susan Olson correctly asserted, “simply 
knowing how many statutes are on the books does not tell much 
about the amount of fee shifting actually occurring.”128 Indeed, the 
amount of fee shifting actually occurring under the EAJAs has prov-
en to be negligible for several reasons.129 First, the statutes were not 
enacted with a well thought-out plan in mind. On the contrary, Con-
gress and state legislatures adopted these statutes on an issue-by-
issue basis in response to political pressure and successful lobbying 
on the part of various interest groups.130 Consequently, while the 
substantive issues covered by the statutes range over a wide spec-
trum of matters,131 many are quite esoteric and serve the interests of 
only a small segment of the population; they are therefore applied 
very infrequently. For example, Utah’s Motor Fuel Marketing Act132
allows the court to award fees to parties injured by sale of gas below 
cost. Minnesota provides for a mandatory fee shift in litigation over 
unfair dairy trade practices,133 and New York has a fee-shifting pro-
vision relating to disputes over fraudulent jewelry appraisals.134 Yet a 
great many issues are left uncovered by this body of legislation.135
Second, the vast majority of the EAJAs authorize fee awards against 
the government, while only a small proportion allows parties to col-
lect from corporations.136 The government is, indisputably, a Levia-
than, but there are many private corporate entities (including finan-
cial institutions, insurance companies, and large corporations) whose 
                                                                                                                                       
 127. See supra text accompanying note 91. Not all the fee-shifting mechanisms are one-
way in favor of the weaker party. According to a survey conducted by Susan Olson in the 
mid-1990s, 52.5% of the statutes incorporate a one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting 
mechanism, 7.9% a one-way pro-defendant fee-shifting mechanism, and 37.6% a two-way 
fee-shifting. Olson, supra note 23, at 553. 
 128. Id. at 552.  
 129. This is, of course, in addition to the debilitating restrictions and conditions 
discussed above, which also affect the overall impact of the fee-shifting statutes.  
 130.  See Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 205 (1984). 
 131. Id.
 132. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-16-7 (2001).  
 133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32.74 (West 2009). 
 134. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 239-c (McKinney 1982).  
 135. Fee-shifting statutes can be divided into four main categories based on the 
substantive claims that can be made under them: civil right suits, consumer protection 
suits, employment suits, and environmental protection suits. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Access 
to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2001).  
 136. See generally CRS Report, supra note 23; Olson, supra note 23, at 550. 
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litigation resources dwarf those of the average American to the same 
extent as those of the government, if not more so.137
 It is vital, therefore, to supplement the valuable mechanisms dis-
cussed above with a more comprehensive legal mechanism that will 
enable the nonwealthy to access the civil justice system on equal foot-
ing with more powerful individuals and institutions. The next Part of 
the Article puts forth just such a device. 
III.   GENERAL PROGRESSIVE ONE-WAY FEE SHIFTING—A PROPOSAL
 In this Part, a general progressive one-way fee-shifting rule is pro-
posed as a means for restoring equal justice and assisting people of 
modest means in financing litigation against wealthy adversaries. Un-
der the proposed rule, courts would be directed to award attorney fees 
to low- and middle-income litigants who prevail in civil litigation 
against moneyed litigants, whether private corporations or govern-
mental agencies. However, the courts would order each party to pay its 
own fees when the wealthy party prevails. This rule is “general” in 
that it covers all civil actions regardless of the specific substantive is-
sue underlying the litigation or the nature and size of the sought-after 
relief. It is also “progressive” as it applies only to actions in which the 
financial resources of the parties to the litigation are sufficiently dis-
parate. Lastly, it is unidirectional in mandating a one-way transfer of 
wealth from the haves to the have-nots, never vice-versa.138   
                                                                                                                                       
 137. For an illuminating analysis, see Galanter, supra note 2. Subsequent empirical 
studies of trial and appellate courts have confirmed Galanter’s basic findings. These 
studies indicate that classes of litigants with the greatest resources and the lowest relative 
risks in litigation enjoy the highest rates of success in both trial and appellate courts. 
Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 9, at 103-04 nn.82-83.  
 138. In a 1981 paper, Phyllis Monroe proposes one-way fee shift in favor of 
disadvantaged litigants (whether plaintiff or defendant), but her proposal is very different 
from the one proposed herein. According to her proposal “[f]ollowing a pre-trial judicial 
determination that a litigant lacks the financial means to afford counsel, such litigant shall 
be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees if he or she is the prevailing party in the 
subsequent civil action or proceeding.” It is also proposed that the court would have 
discretion to refuse to award attorney fees to an otherwise eligible litigant “when recovery 
of attorney fees would work an undue financial hardship on the losing party or upon a 
finding that such litigant acted in bad faith.” Phyllis A. Monroe, Comment, Financial 
Barriers to Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148, 
167 (1981). This proposal, while commendable, would fall short of solving the access to 
justice problem it was designed to solve. First, fee shifting is effected only when the litigant 
cannot afford counsel. Thus, only the very indigent would be entitled to collect attorney 
fees, as most people can afford to hire an attorney—perhaps not the best attorney on the 
market, but an affordable attorney. As argued above, the real problem is much broader. 
Under the current system, the imbalance in economic resources is reflected not only in the 
inability to have access to legal assistance, but also in the quality of such legal assistance. 
Those with greater resources often win at trial not on the merits but because they can 
afford higher-quality legal assistance, which significantly impacts the persuasiveness of 
their cases. It is, therefore, essential for the administration of justice to neutralize, to 
whatever extent possible, resource disparities between parties and create a relatively level 
playing field between them. Second, Monroe’s proposed mechanism leaves many issues 
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 This general and progressive rule combines features from the 
American and English Rules, fusing them into a single mechanism 
that realizes the best of both worlds. As previously discussed, under 
the American Rule, which governs the majority of civil litigation in 
the United States, each party is responsible for its own attorney fees, 
regardless of the outcome of the litigation. The English Rule, also 
known as the “loser pays rule,” which reigns in the rest of the indu-
strialized world, asserts that the loser must pay the winner’s legal 
costs.139 Each of these rules has built-in features that impair equal 
access to justice.140 The English Rule adversely affects lower- and 
middle-class litigants who could potentially lose a great deal if un-
successful at court. Not only would they have to pay their own fees, 
but also their adversary’s.141 This could be quite substantial. Low- 
and average-income individuals, who tend to be risk-averse to begin 
with,142 will thus refrain from bringing lawsuits even if they have a 
valid claim unless they are quite confident they will win.143 Even 
when they do sue, they are induced to accept settlements for much 
less than what they could expect to win at trial due to the high finan-
cial risk they bear if the trial is taken to its end.144
 The American Rule counteracts this particular risk by exempting 
the losing party from paying the winner’s attorney fees. Unfortunately, 
from an access to justice perspective, this rule is at least as flawed as 
                                                                                                                                       
which are crucial for its success unattended to, such as how to define “prevailing party,” 
and what would constitute “an undue financial hardship” on the opposing party. Third, and 
most importantly, Monroe’s proposed mechanism would not work because it leaves lawyers 
undercompensated for the risk they assume in taking on the case on a no-win, no-fee basis. 
Lawyers would take such cases only if their expected income is positive, and Monroe’s 
scheme leaves lawyers with a negative expected income in (almost) all cases. Only those 
cases in which success is guaranteed would have a positive expected value; such cases do 
not exist in the real world. As a result, no lawyer would agree to represent a poor litigant 
even if they were entitled to collect their fees from the losing party. As I shall demonstrate 
below, the mechanism proposed in this Article provides a comprehensive, just, and efficient 
solution to all of these problems.      
 139. Olson, supra note 23, at 549; see generally W. Kent Davis, The International View 
of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays 
Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 384-85 (1999) (discussing how “the loser also 
has to pay the modest attorney fees for the winner in these nations”); see also Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 
139 (1984) (“The United States is virtually alone among the industrialized democracies in 
having as its basic rule that each side pays its own lawyer, win or lose.”).  
 140. In this Part, I mention only the shortcomings related to access to justice. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the rules for the 
system as a whole, including their effect on overall litigation, frivolous claims, settlements, 
and legal expenses, see infra Part IV.  
 141. Davis, supra note 139, at 384-85. 
 142. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 54-55, 59 n.32 
(3d ed. 2003) (arguing that “the higher a person’s wealth, the less averse he is to a given 
size risk”); Krent, supra note 14, at 2062. 
 143. POSNER, supra note 14, at 587; Root, supra note 91, at 607-08. 
 144. Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Fee Shifting: Lessons from the 
Experience in Ontario, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 136 (1984). 
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the English Rule. A fundamental concern with the American Rule is 
that it forces people to spend substantial sums of money on legal fees 
in order to protect their rights, but it denies them compensation for 
that expense even when vindicated by a court ruling or favorable set-
tlement.145 For low- and middle-income individuals, this is a critical 
problem that often means they are barred from pursuing their rights. 
In a large number of cases, the American Rule makes it impossible for 
people with modest means to retain a lawyer, let alone high quality 
counsel. As defendants, they lack the resources to pay their fees; as 
plaintiffs with nonmonetizable claims or claims with a too small an 
expected payoff, they fail to attract contingency fee lawyers. Moreover, 
even when the potential recovery is large enough to attract a lawyer, a 
big chunk goes to cover fees, leading to undercompensation of the 
plaintiff’s losses. Either way, the poor are at a great disadvantage.146
The government and the market’s big guns exploit this predicament to 
deter low- and average-income people from suing them, as well as to 
force them into accepting low settlements. They do this by threatening 
to draw out the litigation indefinitely, which would force their poorer 
adversaries to spend huge sums of money (that they do not have) with-
out any prospect of return on the horizon.147   
                                                                                                                                       
 145. See Root, supra note 91, at 597-98. 
 146. See James H. Cheek III, Note, Attorney’s Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden 
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1216 (1967) (arguing that “the poor will never have completely 
free access to the courts unless the American rule that each litigant must bear the burden 
of paying his own attorney’s fees is changed”).  
 147. Unfortunately, this is the reality of the American civil justice system. In his well-
known article, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 
(1992), Bob Rabin looked at the adversarial techniques employed by the tobacco industry in 
suits brought against it by individuals and their families who had contracted smoke-
related illnesses (a paradigmatic case of one-shotters versus repeat players). The tobacco 
companies retained counsel from the most prestigious law firms and spared no cost in their 
attempt to exhaust their adversaries’ resources short of the courthouse doors. As Townsley 
& Hanks described, they took thorough advantage of the large arsenal of easily 
manipulated procedural mechanisms that our adversarial system offers: 
They have done this by resisting all discovery aimed at them, thus requiring a 
court hearing and order before plaintiffs can obtain even the most rudimentary 
discovery. They have done it by getting confidentiality orders attached to the 
discovery materials they finally produce, thus preventing plaintiffs’ counsel from 
sharing the fruits of discovery and forcing each plaintiff to reinvent the wheel. 
They have done it by taking exceedingly lengthy oral depositions of plaintiffs and 
by gathering, through written deposition, every scrap of paper ever generated 
about a plaintiff, from cradle to grave. And they have done it by taking endless 
depositions of plaintiffs, expert witnesses, and by naming multiple experts of 
their own for each specialty, such as pathology, thereby putting plaintiffs’ counsel 
in the dilemma of taking numerous expensive depositions or else not knowing 
what the witness intends to testify to at trial. And they have done it by taking 
dozens and dozens of oral depositions, all across the country, of trivial fact 
witnesses, particularly in the final days before trial. 
William E. Townsley & Dale K. Hanks, The Trial Court’s Responsibility to Make Cigarette 
Disease Litigation Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989) (internal 
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 The general progressive one-way fee-shifting rule I propose here 
would be a successful antidote to these shortcomings. The proposed 
rule borrows features from both the American and the English rules 
and incorporates them into a hybrid regime that takes into account 
the parties’ economic means. Under this model, in any given case, the 
relative economic power of the parties to the litigation would deter-
mine which rule governs attorney fees recovery. Based on their  
resources, plaintiffs and defendants would be classified into one of 
two categories—“poor” or “rich” (as defined according to a formula  
discussed below).148
 In cases where both adversaries are equally economically 
equipped (or ill-equipped) and thus fall into the same category of liti-
gants, the current American Rule would govern the fee award. Thus, 
each party would be responsible for its respective attorney fees. How-
ever, when one party (be it plaintiff or defendant) is rich and the oth-
er poor, if the poor party wins, the English Rule would apply and the 
rich party would have to pay the poor party’s actual legal fees. On the 
other hand, if the rich party wins, the American Rule would apply 
and each party would bear its own attorney fees.149 The crucial point 
of this combined rule is that it is sensitive to power disparities be-
tween the parties, and when such a disparity is identified, the rule 
levels the imbalance through one-way fee shifting in favor of the dis-
advantaged party. 
TABLE 1
The General Progressive One-Way Fee-Shifting Rule 
Poor Defendant Rich Defendant















                                                                                                                                       
citations omitted); see also Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort 
Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992). 
 148. See infra discussion at Part III.B. 
 149. When there is more than one plaintiff or defendant who are not themselves 
adversaries (namely, they either claim the same relief as the plaintiffs or are being sued for 
the same relief as the defendants), the financial assessment and the classification as “poor” 
or “rich” will be based on their accumulated economic resources. For example, if there is 
one plaintiff whose net worth is $3 million and 10 defendants who have individual net 
worths of $300,000 each, the latter will be considered, for our purposes, as one individual 
with a total net worth of $3 million; the adversaries will then be considered as balanced in 
power, and the American Rule will apply to the litigation. 
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 Furthermore, to make the fee structure attractive to high quality 
lawyers, I propose taking from the English system yet another fea-
ture, the conditional fee, which is the English counterpart to the con-
tingency fee.150 Conditional fees enable lawyers to take cases on a no-
win, no-fee basis without violating the prohibition on maintenance 
and champerty. Under conditional fee agreements, a lawyer acts on 
the understanding that if the case is lost, she will be paid nothing for 
the work she has done. If, instead, the case is won, in addition to her 
standard fees she will be entitled to a premium, called a “success fee” 
or “uplift,” to compensate her for the risk she undertook in taking the 
case on this basis.151 The success fee is not linked to the amount of re-
covery (as it is in contingency fee) but rather calculated as a percen-
tage of the lawyer’s standard fee, varying by the level of risk she bore 
in taking on the case. The stronger the case was a priori, the lower 
the success fee, and vice versa.152 The success fee is not, however, 
without limit. There is a statutory cap on what can be charged as a 
success fee set at 100% of the lawyer’s standard fee.153 Under the 
English Rule, both the lawyer’s standard fees and the success fee are 
                                                                                                                                       
 150. In England, contingency fees are prohibited based on the champerty and 
maintenance doctrines under which lawyers are forbidden to support the litigation of their 
clients in return for a share in the proceeds if the claim meets with success. See, e.g., In re 
Trepca Mines Ltd. (No. 2), [1963] Ch. 199, at 219-20; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit 
Suisse, [1980] Q.B. 629, 654. Until the 1980s, this prohibition on contingency fees had no 
significant effect on the ability of low- and average-income people to access the civil justice 
system due to the expansive legal aid system covering about 70% of families in England 
and Wales. See Woodroffe, supra note 60, at 348. By the end of the 1980s, however, the 
political atmosphere had changed radically. Following an all-out attack on legal aid led by 
Thatcher’s Conservative government, public funding for legal aid was slashed repeatedly, 
and gradually the proportion of the population entitled to the aid shrunk dramatically. See
Richard L. Abel, An American Hamburger Stand in St. Paul’s Cathedral: Replacing Legal 
Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 
268-70 (2001); Woodroffe, supra note 60, at 348. Consequently, legal aid programs had no 
recourse but to lower the cut-off levels of income and capital for the purpose of assistance. 
Augmented by the considerable increase in legal costs, which had accelerated during the 
economic boom of the mid-1980s, the effect was that only the wealthy or destitute had 
access to justice. See Woodroffe, supra note 60, at 349. Parliament reacted to this 
predicament by passing into law the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 (U.K.), 1990, 
c.41, authorizing Conditional Fee Agreements (“CFAs”) in specified proceedings to be 
declared in orders issued by the Lord Chancellor. The Conditional Fee Agreements Order 
of 1995 permitted parties to enter into CFAs in personal injury, bankruptcy, insolvency, or 
administration, and some human rights proceedings. Subsequent legislation greatly 
expanded the range of proceedings in which conditional fees are permissible, and as of July 
1998, parties could enter into CFAs in all civil cases, except for a range of family and 
crime-related proceedings. Moorhead, supra note 58, at 477. 
 151. ACCESS TO JUSTICE WITH CONDITIONAL FEES: A LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT
CONSULTATION PAPER § 2.1 (Mar. 1998); see also Moorhead, supra note 58, at 475. 
 152. ACCESS TO JUSTICE WITH CONDITIONAL FEES, supra note 151.  
 153. Moorhead, supra note 58, at 477. The English Law Society has recommended an 
additional cap on the success fee to no more than 25% of recovery. This cap would, 
however, be voluntary. Id. at 477-78.   
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recoverable from the losing party.154 As we shall see shortly, using 
the conditional fee instead of the contingency fee as a mechanism to 
incentivize lawyers to take the case on a no-win, no-fee basis would 
solve many of the access to justice problems that afflict the current 
civil justice system. 
A.   Who is a “Prevailing Party”? 
 Under the general progressive rule, fees would be awarded to the 
poor party automatically upon prevailing in litigation. The question 
remains, however, as to how “prevailing party” should be defined. For 
the proposed fee-shifting regime to be an effective distributive justice 
tool, the concept of “prevailing party” must be delineated more broad-
ly than its scope under current EAJA jurisprudence.155 To begin with, 
a poor plaintiff who is awarded nominal damages (for instance, one 
dollar in a case where the sought-after relief was $17 million) should 
be considered a “prevailing party” for attorney fees purposes.156
Moreover, a declaratory judgment or an injunction should constitute 
relief that entitles poor plaintiffs to a fee award, regardless of wheth-
er it ultimately affected the rich defendant’s behavior.157 Further-
more, as held by the Supreme Court, prevailing in litigation should 
not be limited to entry of a final judgment but should also include a 
favorable settlement.158 In contrast to the approach in current juris-
prudence,159 however, the “catalyst theory”160 should be adopted and a 
                                                                                                                                       
 154. See PAUL FENN ET AL., THE FUNDING OF PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION:
COMPARISONS OVER TIME AND ACROSS JURISDICTIONS iv (2005) (discussing how the 
“claimant solicitor’s own cost risk premium [is] now paid by the losing defendant”). 
Initially, success fees were not recoverable and were therefore paid by the lawyer’s client. 
Pursuant to the 1999 Access to Justice Act, however, the success fee as well as insurance 
premiums became recoverable items. PAUL FENN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL FEES
ON THE SELECTION, HANDLING AND OUTCOMES OF PERSONAL INJURY CASES (2002).  
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.  
 156. See the actual case of Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), where the plaintiff 
was awarded nominal damages in the amount of one dollar when he had sought $17 
million. The Court refused to award him attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), despite the fact that he had established a 
violation of his right to procedural due process, because he could not prove actual injury. 
Id. at 115-16; see also Rosenthal, supra note 114, at 53-57. 
 157. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988). Here, the Supreme Court held that 
a declaratory judgment constitutes relief that entitles the plaintiff to a fee award under the 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), only if it affects the 
behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. Id. at 4. In Rhodes, two prisoners had filed 
a suit against prison officials for refusing to allow them to subscribe to a certain magazine. 
They won a declaratory judgment but only after one had died and the other was released 
from prison. Id. at 2-3. Therefore, they were denied a fee award. Id. at 4. 
 158. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 (1980) (finding that prevailing in litigation is 
not limited to a final judgment but also includes favorable settlements). Favorable settlement 
should be construed broadly to include all settlements that are not nuisance settlements. 
 159. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (“The ‘catalyst theory’ is not a permissible basis for the award of 
attorney’s fees under the FHAA and ADA.”). 
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poor party considered a “prevailing party” even when she has not se-
cured a judgment on the merits or court-ordered consent decree but 
has succeeded in attaining the sought-after relief in that the lawsuit 
led to a voluntary change in her adversary’s conduct. Lastly, if there 
is more than one claim in a lawsuit, a poor plaintiff need only succeed 
on some of the claims in order to be considered a “prevailing party” 
for attorney fees purposes. However, “[w]here the plaintiff has failed 
to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his success-
ful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be ex-
cluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.”161
B.   The Matter of Administration 
 As described above, under the proposed general progressive one-
way fee-shifting regime, the applicable attorney fee rule would de-
pend on how the parties are categorized—rich or poor.162 Without a 
simple and effective method of classification, however, this scheme 
cannot work. Indeed, excessive costs of administration could under-
mine the viability of the proposed regime.163 There are a number of 
different ways in which the rule could be administered, each with its 
advantages and disadvantages. Three such possible methods are par-
ticularly applicable—one generalized, the second particularized, and 
the third gradational.  
 The generalized method of administration would use a party’s type
classification as proxy for its economic power. Under this system, the 
entire universe of litigants would be categorized as either individuals 
or institutional entities (the latter comprising private entities, such 
as corporations, financial institutions, and insurance companies, as 
well as public entities, such as the federal and state governments and 
governmental agencies).164 For fee award purposes, all individuals 
                                                                                                                                       
 160. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 161. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983). This is also the law in England. 
See Johnsey Estates (1990) Ltd. v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp. & the Regions, 
[2001] All Eng. Rep. (D) 135 (Apr) (“[T]he judge may make different orders for costs  
in relation to discrete issues—and, in particular, should consider doing so where a  
party has been successful on one issue but unsuccessful on another issue and, in that 
event, may make an order for costs against the party who has been generally successful in 
the litigation . . . .”). 
 162. See discussion in supra text accompanying notes 148-49. 
 163. See Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 321-22.   
 164. Treating governmental “public” entities and large institutional “private” entities 
identically can be justified both empirically and theoretically. From the empirical 
perspective, it has been established that the appropriate distinction to be made is between 
repeat players and one-shotters, rather than public versus private litigants. Galanter, 
supra note 2, at 97. Indeed, the features that give a litigating party a relative advantage at 
trial are not unique to the government and are shared by private corporate entities too.  
Economies of scale are [also] characteristic of financial institutions and large 
corporations; they can build a record, are able to  “play the odds,” and are well 
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would be categorized as “poor,” while institutional entities would be 
deemed “rich.” The justification for such a generalized method is two-
fold: first, since, on average, individuals are weaker and possess few-
er resources than institutional entities, the rule thus administered 
would have a progressive effect in total. Second, institutional entities 
are much better positioned than individuals to both prevent and 
spread the costs of litigation (especially when legal expenses insur-
ance is available).165 It is, therefore, justified from both efficiency and 
fairness standpoints to subject them to a different and more stringent 
fee standard. In order to prevent gross injustices, the generalized me-
thod could be refined by providing small incorporated businesses the 
opportunity to prove that they should be treated as individuals for fee 
award purposes. To obtain favorable treatment, such businesses 
would file their tax records for the three years preceding the lawsuit 
with the court together with the complaint or answer; if the average 
net worth for that period did not exceed a certain ceiling ($500,000, 
for example), the entity would be treated as an individual for fee-
shifting purposes.  
 The main advantage of this method of administration is its sim-
plicity. Under this system, the proposed fee-shifting rule would be 
almost self-executing, since identifying the category to which each of 
the parties belongs would be, in most cases, fairly uncomplicated. 
The disadvantage of this method, however, is both its over- and un-
der-inclusiveness, which would inevitably lead to possibly regressive 
outcomes in specific cases, as opposed to the rule’s overall progressive 
distributive effect. In fact, any egalitarian-oriented rule that is not 
case-specific produces regressive results in particular cases.166 It is 
indisputable that not all individuals are poor; indeed, some are ac-
tually quite wealthy. Hence, defining all individuals categorically as 
“poor” for fee award purposes would, in certain instances, unavoida-
bly yield regressive, and therefore unjust, outcomes. The tradeoff is 
                                                                                                                                       
positioned to play for the rules of the game and to forego immediate gains. It 
should, therefore, come as no shock that their success rate in litigation is 
comparable to that of governmental bodies. From a theoretical perspective, the 
dichotomy between private and public entities, which organizes legal doctrine, 
has been heavily criticized. Government agencies and corporations are both 
bureaucratic entities and share many common features.  
Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 9, at 137-38. (internal citations omitted). Thus, using the 
public/private distinction to favor certain organizations (private) over others (public) is 
unmerited and untenable. For an analogy between corporate law and administrative law 
as two bodies of legal doctrine devoted to justifying bureaucracy, see generally Gerald E. 
Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984). For an 
excellent critique of the private/public distinction, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal 
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1128-41 (1980). 
 165. Cf. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 37-85 (2004). 
 166. See TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 12- 
13 (2007). 
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clear: the more general the rule, the easier it is to administer, but the 
more likely it is to miss the mark in particular cases.   
 Whereas the generalized method would sacrifice accuracy for sim-
plicity, the particularized method would take the opposite path: tai-
loring the application of the fee award rule to the actual (or lack of) 
disparity in wealth between the litigating parties. At the commence-
ment of the trial, litigants—other than the government and its agen-
cies, which would invariably be classified as “rich”—would file (to-
gether with the complaint and the answer) their tax records for the 
three years preceding the litigation.167 If the disparity between their 
average net worths (including both annual income and assets) did not 
exceed a certain set percentage (for example, 500%), the court would 
declare the wealthier party “rich” and the other party “poor” and ap-
ply the fee-shifting rule accordingly.168 The particularized method 
should, however, include a floor and ceiling, below and beyond which 
the American Rule would apply, regardless of the disparity between 
the parties’ net worths. The floor would prevent situations where one 
low-income party would be forced to pay the attorney fees of another 
low-income party. If, for instance, the net worth of Party A is $10,000 
and Party B’s net worth is $51,000, it would be unjust to declare Par-
ty B “rich” and make him liable for Party A’s fees if he loses his case, 
despite the over-500% disparity in the parties’ net worths. A ceiling is 
required because above a certain income level, the concern of unequal 
access to justice which the general progressive rule is designed to 
remedy is not implicated. If, for example, Corporation A with an av-
erage net worth of $50 million sues Corporation B whose average net 
worth is $1 billion, there is no need to intervene in the name of equal 
justice as both parties are equally able to fend for themselves.169
 The advantage of the particularized method is, of course, its preci-
sion and ability to contend with equal justice issues on a case-by-case 
basis. Any criticism would undoubtedly focus on the complexity and 
costs of this method of administration, which may seem excessive. 
However, such concerns would be unfounded. Income tax records are 
readily available and could certainly be produced along with the com-
                                                                                                                                       
 167. The three years rule is designed to prevent both intentional manipulations of the 
rule and injustices that could transpire due to a one time upside or downside fluctuation in 
a party’s income that affects its net worth. In order to protect parties’ privacy, the filed tax 
records would not become public record and would be returned to the parties upon a 
judicial decision as to which rule will govern the fee award.  
 168. In order to ensure that corporations do not channel all litigation to subsidiaries 
with net worths that are low or even in the red, the consolidated tax records of a parent 
corporation and all its affiliated subsidiaries would be the required records for filing.  
 169. To enable parties to protect their privacy, they would be allowed to choose not to 
submit their tax records, with the outcome being that they would automatically be declared 
“rich” for fee award purposes; in such circumstances, unless the opposing litigant’s net 
worth exceeded the ceiling or the opposing litigant also declined to file tax records, the one-
way fee-shifting rule would be applied against the nonfiling party. 
748 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:717 
plaint and the answer. In fact, like methods are already in operation 
without much apparent problem; for example, in many states “punitive 
damages are already a function of the defendant’s wealth.”170 Moreo-
ver, a quick glance at the current fee-shifting practice under the EA-
JAs would also show the excessive cost criticism to be meritless. These 
statutes, in both their federal and state versions, generally contain eli-
gibility restrictions based on wealth and size of the parties.171 If these 
restrictions are administrable, then there are no grounds for question-
ing the feasibility of the proposed particularized method.172
 A third possible method would be to adopt a gradated rather than 
binary scheme. Instead of only having two categories, rich and poor, 
and always awarding the full amount of attorney fees to poor parties 
when they prevail in litigation against rich parties, there would be a 
gradated scheme linking the size of the recovery to the disparity in 
wealth between the parties. For example, if there was a 250% dispar-
ity in the net worth of the parties, only 50% of the fees would be 
awarded to the victor at trial; a 500% disparity, however, would lead 
to a full shifting of fees to the rich party. The distributive appeal of 
such a method might, however, be outweighed in this case by the 
complexity and high costs of operation it entails.173
                                                                                                                                       
 170. Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1030 (2001).  
 171. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 23, at 561-62. The Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B), defines the parties eligible to claim attorney fees under the statute 
as follows:  
“[P]arty” means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at 
the time the civil action was filed, or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated 
business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, 
or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time 
the civil action was filed[.]  
 172. It should also be noted that even though the particularized method ties the 
parties’ income levels to the rule governing the fees, it still does not trigger the so-called 
double-distortion problem. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor 
the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 822-25 (2000) (discussing the distortion of work incentives 
argument). For an excellent and concise account of the double-distortion argument, see 
Sanchirico, supra note 170, at 1014-16. This is so because the matter of which rule would 
apply to a specific case is determined not based on the absolute income level of either the 
plaintiff or the defendant, but rather on their relative wealth. And since it is impossible to 
know in advance who would be the adversary in any future litigation, work incentive is 
minimally affected by the proposed rule.  
 173. According to George Shepherd, while a gradual fee award scheme is operated in 
Continental Europe, it is concerned not with the relative wealth of the parties but to what 
extent the winner prevailed in litigation. The size of the fee award shifted to the prevailing 
party is determined by the ratio of the plaintiff’s actual recovery to the amount that the 
plaintiff sought in her complaint. George B. Shepherd, The Impacts of the European Rule 
for Fee-Shifting on Litigation Behavior, in BALANCING OF INTERESTS: LIBER AMICORUM
PETER HAY ZUM 70, 381, 383 (Hans-Eric Rasmussen-Bonne, Richard Freer, Wolfgang Luke 
& Wolfgang Weitnauer eds., 2005).  
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C.   Attorney Compensation Formula 
 Another central issue that could greatly affect the success or failure 
of the proposed fee-shifting rule is the formula used to compute the at-
torney fees. Since the general progressive rule is a market-based me-
chanism, the fee structure it incorporates is crucial to its success. 
Ideally, the compensation formula should serve several goals simulta-
neously. First, it should provide high quality lawyers with an incentive 
to represent low- and average-income individuals on a no-win, no-fee 
basis. Second, it should induce lawyers to diligently investigate the 
claims of potential clients and agree to take on only those with merit 
(i.e., cases with over 50% chance of success), making lawyers potent 
and effective gatekeepers. Third, the formula should align the inter-
ests of lawyers and their clients, thereby avoiding potential conflicts of 
interest. Fourth, it should forestall the moral hazard problem that can 
arise anytime a party can shift all of its costs to another party. Lastly, 
it should entail minimal judicial involvement in order to prevent long 
and expensive satellite litigation over the amount of the fee award. 
Unfortunately, in reality, no fee arrangement can fully realize all of 
these goals at once. Hence, hard choices must be made when construct-
ing the compensation formula—choices that reflect the underlying 
theoretical justification for fee shifting.174
 This Section outlines one such compensation formula that at-
tempts to serve as many of the positive goals described above as poss-
ible. I propose using the lawyer’s standard hourly rate, which can be 
deduced from her historical billing rates,175 multiplied by the number 
of hours spent on the case (the “basic charge”). This basic charge 
would be supplemented by a success fee, reflecting the extent of risk 
the lawyer assumed in taking the case on a no-win, no-fee basis. Mi-
nor risk would entitle the lawyer to a success fee ranging between 
10% and 20% of the basic charge, whereas riskier cases would entitle 
her to a much higher percentage. The success fee would be capped at 
100% of the basic charge, a maximum that would be warranted only 
                                                                                                                                       
 174. See Marshall J. Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court Awarded Attorney Fees,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 268 (1984) (arguing that “procedural tools for implementing 
fee shifting by court award will operate differently depending on the theoretical justification 
for fee shifting which is deemed legitimate by Congress and the courts”). 
 175. In the unlikely case that a lawyer has no historical billing rate, because, for 
instance, she is new to the profession or has worked only on a contingency fee basis thus far, 
the fee would be computed based on the so-termed lodestar method. The lodestar figure is 
derived from the prevailing rates charged in the community for similar work, which means a 
reasonable hourly rate in the relevant market. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3d § 2675.1, 376 
(1998). Yet, the matters of identifying the relevant market and the rates that prevail in that 
market are both quite problematic and hard to administer; they should therefore be avoided 
whenever possible. See Breger, supra note 174, at 261-62; William B. Rubenstein, The 
Expert’s Corner: Why the Percentage Method?, CLASS ACTION ATTORNEY FEE DIGEST, Mar. 
2008, at 93 (arguing for the percentage method and against the lodestar method). 
750 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:717 
when the case was exceptionally risky (but still meritorious). And of 
course, both the basic charge and success fee would be shifted to the 
rich party whenever a poor adversary prevails. 
 By allowing lawyers to charge their standard fees plus a generous 
premium, this fee structure would ensure that high quality lawyers 
would not shy away from representing low-income clients. Shifting 
the fees to the rich party would offer these lawyers peace of mind in 
knowing that they will have a perfectly solvent party to collect from if 
they win in court.176 The hourly-rate formula would incentivize law-
yers to optimize the amount of time they devote to their clients’ cas-
es, thereby aligning their interests.177 Yet, the risk of losing and re-
ceiving no payment for their time and resources would minimize the 
likelihood of lawyers driving up the bill by spending needless hours 
on cases.178 Under the no-win, no-fee compensation structure, lawyers 
have ample incentive to screen out frivolous claims so as to prevent 
wasted opportunity cost in the form of unpaid-for time and re-
sources.179 This corresponds with the reason for capping the success 
fee at 100% of the lawyer’s basic charge. This cap is designed to dis-
courage risk-loving lawyers from taking on low-probability lawsuits 
with a less than 50% chance of success.180 For even such a risk-loving 
lawyer, assuming she acts rationally, would refrain from litigating a 
case with only a 33% chance of success if the maximum amount she 
could expect to collect in fees would be twice her basic charge, which 
would leave her with a negative expected income.181     
                                                                                                                                       
 176. Cf. Yeazell, supra note 67, at 186-90 (arguing that changes in the structure of the 
market that include an increase in house ownership, the availability of automobile and 
liability insurance, and a large expansion in consumer credit contributed to the rising of 
the plaintiff bar by creating a vast pool of solvent defendants).  
 177. See Kritzer, supra note 24, at 1966-67. Another compensation formula that 
achieves a similar result is the percentage method, essentially a variation on the 
contingency fee in that it awards counsel a fee in relation to the benefits achieved for the 
party. The proposed compensation formula is, however, superior to the percentage method 
because, just like contingency fees, the percentage method could work only when the 
sought-after relief is a large monetary amount. It is completely unworkable in many cases 
that implicate access to justice problems, such as nonmonetizable claims, small meritorious 
claims, and claims in which the poor party is the defendant rather than plaintiff. See
discussion and text accompanying supra notes 76-81. 
 178. John Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 439, 
452 (1986).  
 179. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 163, 207 (2000).  
 180. For a different point of view, see Woodroffe, supra note 60, at 356-57: 
There may be a case for introducing an uplift even greater than one hundred 
percent for cases where the chances of success are less than fifty-fifty. It is 
difficult to see why, from an ethical standpoint, an uplift of two hundred 
percent should not be allowed where a case has a one-third chance of success. 
 181. If she has only a 33% chance of success, she will need to charge a success fee that 
is at least 200% of the basic charge to arrive at a positive expected income.
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 Again, the ideal compensation formula would be self-executing, as 
judicial involvement inevitably would generate protracted and ex-
pensive satellite litigation over the fee award, which at times would 
eclipse the primary litigation.182 Regrettably, it is impossible to avoid 
judicial involvement completely, due to the moral hazard problem en-
tailed by any fee-shifting scheme. Moral hazard refers to the prospect 
of a party insulated from risk behaving differently from how it would 
behave were it fully exposed to that risk.183 The proposed general 
progressive one-way fee-shifting rule gives rise to an acute moral ha-
zard problem because the party negotiating the fees would not bear 
the risk of paying them. The poor party would sign the retainer 
agreement, but her rich adversary would be the one to eventually pay 
the bill. It would, therefore, be advantageous to both the poor party 
and her attorney to set in the retainer agreement both an inflated 
hourly rate and the maximum success fee allowed under law for all 
cases, regardless of the actual risk involved in the particular case. 
 The first part of the problem—the inflated hourly rate—can, for 
the most part, be remedied by prohibiting lawyers from charging a 
fee that exceeds their standard hourly rate (as ascertained from his-
torical billing records). However, the second part of the problem—the 
exaggerated success fee—is harder to verify as it is more subjective 
and, therefore, difficult to measure and monitor. Consequently, there 
is no escaping limited ex post supervision of attorney compensation 
by a judicial officer. One possibility already raised is that the fees 
would be subject to a reasonableness test in the framework of a fee 
petition filed by the losing party to contest the fee request. Fee peti-
tions would be heard not by a judge, but by a special magistrate sit-
ting as a taxing officer, whose authority would be limited to ascer-
taining the following items: (1) that the fees charged in the fee re-
quest are no higher than the standard fee the same lawyer charges 
paying clients; (2) that the billing hours have not been inflated; and, 
most importantly, (3) that the size of the success fee reasonably re-
flects the risk assumed by the lawyer in taking on the case. 
 The third item is, of course, the most challenging to verify and 
would require some degree of expertise on the part of the taxing offic-
er. It would, therefore, be beneficial to refer all fee petitions to tax-
                                                                                                                                       
 182. See Golden Gate Audobon Soc’y, Inc. v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 732 F. Supp. 
1014 (N.D. Cal. 1989). In this case, a prevailing plaintiff requested $43,420 in fees after the 
court determined that the government had not been substantially justified in refusing to 
file an environmental impact statement. The government challenged a portion of the fee 
request, amounting to $9,408, on various grounds. In litigating the fee petition the 
government caused the plaintiffs to incur approximately $31,000 in additional expenses 
and incurred substantial costs itself (not to mention wasting the court’s time), all in order 
to potentially save less than a $10,000. Id. at 1022 n.12.
 183. See Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS.
L. REV. 65, 67-68 (1991) (discussing the moral hazard problem in the insurance context).
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ing officers with expertise who could more consistently assess the 
level of risk involved in different types of claims.184 The taxing offic-
er’s decision would be final. Furthermore, to prevent frivolous fee pe-
titions, she would be authorized to order a petitioner to pay addition-
al costs if the fee petition is found to be unmerited. The taxing officer 
would also be authorized to penalize an attorney for charging exces-
sive fees (inflating either his billing hours or the success fee) by re-
ducing the fees awarded to him to an amount below what he would 
have been entitled to had he charged reasonable fees.185
 An alternative method to the ex post judicial supervision on the 
reasonableness of the fee request would be to make the poor party li-
able for a small percentage of her attorney fee (between 5% and 10% 
of the fee charged, for example). Such a “deductible” would solve the 
moral hazard problem since it would turn the poor party into a po-
tent supervisor of her attorney’s billing practice at a cost of less redi-
stribution and a heavy burden on the indigent.186
 Part IV now proceeds to elaborate on the effects of the proposed 
general progressive fee-shifting rule. It demonstrates that the rule 
does not only serve the egalitarian goals of extending access to justice 
to a larger segment of the population and facilitating more equitable 
distribution of resources between parties. Indeed, it also improves 
the overall efficiency of the civil justice system by fostering the ex-
pansion of the market for legal services to encompass types of cases 
currently excluded from the new economy of justice.  
IV.   EXPANDING THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES: THE POSITIVE 
EFFECTS OF THE PROGRESSIVE FEE-SHIFTING RULE
 Any proposed fee structure must be evaluated in light of its 
impact on the various elements of litigation as well as on ex ante 
substantive behavior. The effects of attorney fee shifting are, 
however, extremely complex and subject to much controversy. 
Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain whether fee shifting would 
encourage or discourage potential plaintiffs to file claims, whether 
the likelihood of settlement would increase or decrease, and whether 
there would be more or fewer frivolous claims.187 These perplexities 
                                                                                                                                       
 184. See Breger, supra note 174, at 268. 
 185. It is also possible to cap the maximum success fee attorneys would be allowed to 
charge for certain types of cases which are known to be, in most cases, rather simple. For 
example, in England and Wales, the amount of success fee in road traffic accident claims is 
limited to 12.5% of the attorney’s base costs. Consultation Paper, Controlling Costs in 
Defamation Proceedings: Reducing Conditional Fee Agreement Success Fees, MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, at 17, (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/ 
docs/costs-defamation-proceedings-consultation.pdf.
 186. I thank Dean Hanoch Dagan for this excellent suggestion.  
 187. See Kritzer, supra note 24, at 1948 (concluding that it is difficult to predict the 
effects of attorney fee-shifting after surveying the theoretical and empirical literature).  
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lead, in turn, to uncertainty as to the likely impact of fee shifting on 
compliance with primary substantive norms, such as to what extent 
adequate precautions against risk would be taken and obligations 
honored. As Avery Katz has candidly admitted, “the current state of 
economic knowledge does not enable us reliably to predict whether a 
move to fuller indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of 
litigation, let alone whether it would better align those costs with any 
social benefits they might generate.”188 This important caveat 
notwithstanding, there is still much to be gained from trying to 
predict, as much as possible, the likely effects of the proposed fee-
shifting rule on litigation as well as substantive behavior, in terms of 
evaluating the rule’s costs and benefits. 
 To better understand what is at stake in choosing one fee 
structure over another, let us return to the American Rule and 
English Rule, the two ideal-type fee regimes, to discuss briefly their 
effects on litigation and compare them with the expected effects of 
the general progressive rule. The English “loser pays” rule, it is 
maintained, has two positive impacts on litigation: it makes 
victorious plaintiffs and defendants whole, awarding them the full 
costs of litigating their correct position,189 and it improves claim 
quality by reducing the likelihood of frivolous lawsuits while 
increasing the likelihood of strong low-value lawsuits. Making a 
losing plaintiff pay the winning defendant’s legal costs imposes a 
higher expected cost on frivolous lawsuits, thereby forcing plaintiffs 
to carefully assess the strength of their cases and refrain from low-
probability suits.190 In contrast, meritorious low-value claims are 
arguably more likely to be brought, since plaintiffs know that in the 
likely case that they win, they will be reimbursed for all their costs.191
                                                                                                                                       
 188. Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 63, 64 (Boudewijn Boucckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000); see also SHAVELL,
supra note 13, at 432 (“It is not possible to draw general conclusions about the social 
desirability of fee-shifting, although statements can be made in particular circumstances.”).  
 189. See Root, supra note 91, at 604; see also Woodroffe, supra note 60, at 345-46: 
From the defendant’s point of view, it seems unfair to have to pay the legal 
costs incurred in defending an unjustified claim or unwarranted attack that is 
thrown out by the court. Plaintiffs for their part argue that if they have a good 
claim against another party who refuses to pay up when he or she should do so, 
the legal costs of being compelled to sue to enforce their rights should be borne 
by the defendant, for why should the plaintiffs be out-of-pocket simply because 
the defendant was recalcitrant and refused to acknowledge his or her liabilities 
until forced to do so by a judgment of the court? 
 190. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: 
An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 402 (1993); Root, supra note 91, at 605-06. 
 191. See, e.g., James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under 
the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 248-49 (1995).  
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The English Rule has also been claimed to affect litigation rates,192
but while some argue that fee shifting should produce an increase in 
the number of lawsuits,193 others argue that it in fact lessens the 
overall litigation incidence.194 Yet another controversial—and 
theoretically irresolvable—issue is the effect of fee shifting under the 
English Rule on settlement.195
 The biggest disadvantage of the English Rule is its disparate 
impact on litigants of diverging wealth. As discussed above, the 
prospect of having to pay the prevailing party’s attorney fees in full is 
a risk for any litigant. Yet, for the government, large corporations, 
and the wealthy, who tend to be risk-neutral and are often capable of 
spreading their risks, fee shifting is part of their business 
calculations and certainly not a deterrent to filing lawsuits.196 Low- 
and average-income individuals and small businesses, on the other 
hand, are likely to be adversely daunted by this risk. Since those 
parties are usually risk-averse, fee shifting unjustly discourages 
them from initiating actions. Furthermore, when they do file suits, 
they are incentivized to settle for much less than they actually 
deserve given the strength of their claim rather than continue to 
trial.197 This offsets any potential the English Rule may have to 
promote small meritorious claims because, unless the poor plaintiff is 
certain to prevail (which rarely is the case), the threat of what could 
be lost outweighs the possible gain.198
                                                                                                                                       
 192. See, e.g., Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English  
Rule Really Cheaper?, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143 (1987); but see POSNER, supra note 14, at 590 
(“[I]t is unclear whether on balance indemnity raises, lowers, or does not change the 
litigation rate . . . .”). 
 193. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional 
Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as 
Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 760 (1988) (finding no clear evidence that the 
availability of fee shifting leads to an increase in the number of cases filed).  
 194. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 70 (1982); 
Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: 
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990). If a comparison of the number 
of lawsuits filed in England versus the United States is any indication (which is doubtful), 
then Shavell and Snyder & Hughes are correct, as “America has roughly twenty times the 
amount of civil lawsuits as England (figure adjusted for population difference).” Root, 
supra note 91, at 605.  
 195. See Katz, supra note 192, at 157-59. See discussion at infra Part IV.A.4.  
 196. In fact, fee shifting could, at times, encourage such parties to hire a more 
expensive lawyer with the expectation of shifting the cost to their adversary. Hiring a more 
expensive (and perhaps higher quality) lawyer may improve their chances of prevailing in 
litigation. Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: 
Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1871 (1998). 
 197. See id. at 1871; Kritzer, supra note 24, at 1959; see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, 
and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 329-30 (1998). 
 198. In economic terms, the expected cost of litigation may exceed the expected benefit. 
See POSNER, supra note 14, at 587. Posner provides the following example (with slight 
2010]                     JUST FEE SHIFTING 755 
 The American Rule supposedly ameliorates this access to justice 
problem by prescribing that each party pays its own attorney fees. 
The cure, however, turns out to be just as bad as the illness, if not 
worse. First, it is plainly unfair to the winner, whether plaintiff or 
defendant, as it places her in a position of financial loss. As argued by 
Werner Pfennigstorf, 
[A] claimant who is forced to resort to court action to enforce his claim 
against a reluctant debtor is entitled to recover the full value of the 
claim and should not be expected to be satisfied with a lesser amount 
because of the necessity of suing. Likewise, one who successfully de-
fends himself against an unjustified claim raised by another person 
should come out of the experience without financial loss.199
In addition to being unfair, the American Rule is also inefficient. It 
impedes the bringing of certain types of suits (such as small merito-
rious claims and nonmonetary claims) by middle-income plaintiffs 
who are unable to muster sufficient resources to finance the litiga-
tion. As a result, the government and big corporations can engage in 
unlawful conduct with impunity, knowing that the chances of them 
being sued are quite slim. Moreover, the American Rule also prevents 
wrongfully sued defendants with only modest means from adequately 
defending themselves. Lastly, the high costs of litigation, which de-
fendants cannot recover under the American Rule, increase the like-
lihood of frivolous litigation. 
A.   The Argument from Efficiency  
 The general progressive one-way fee-shifting rule proposed here 
retains the advantages of both the English and American Rules, 
while dispensing with the majority of their disadvantages. In treat-
ing disparately equipped litigants differently for fee award purposes, 
the proposed rule would level the litigation strength of the parties 
and thus increase the likelihood of meritorious litigation being 
brought. This, in turn, would bolster deterrence of unlawful conduct 
on the part of the government and large corporations. Thus, this rule 
would guarantee the right of nonwealthy plaintiffs and defendants to 
effectively present their cases before judge or jury. It would ensure 
that a lack of means does not stand in the way of low- and average-
                                                                                                                                       
modifications): Suppose we have a claim for $20, the probability of winning the case is 90%, 
and litigation expenses are $100 for both plaintiff and defendant. The expected benefit 
from litigating the case is $18 ($20 × 90%), while the expected cost is $20 ($200 × 10%). The 
result is that no lawsuit will be filed despite the strength of the claim. See also Charles W. 
Branham, III, It Couldn’t Happen Here: The English Rule—But Not in South Carolina, 49 
S.C. L. REV. 971, 980 (1998) (arguing that “when the potential of bearing the other party’s 
litigation expenses outweighs the potential gain of a meritorious suit, lower-middle-class 
plaintiffs may not sue at all”).  
 199. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 66-67 (1984). 
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income individuals bringing meritorious suits against rich and po-
werful adversaries, even when the claim is of low monetary value, 
while circumventing the obstacles that thwart such lawsuits under 
both the English and the American Rules. The proposed rule would 
also enable poorer defendants to fight unmerited actions brought by 
powerful adversaries. It would not, however, increase the likelihood 
of frivolous claims, since the weak party will be subject to the market 
for legal services, as discussed below. As far as rich parties are con-
cerned, the proposed fee-shifting rule would dilute their excessive 
power. However, as explained, the risk of reimbursing the attorney 
fees of winning opponents is purely a business calculation for such 
parties since they have the resources to pay for high quality legal as-
sistance. Therefore the proposed rule would not hinder them from 
bringing (large or small) meritorious lawsuits or from defending 
against unmeritorious claims. It would, however, discourage strong 
parties from bringing low-probability suits against weaker adversa-
ries in an attempt to intimidate them. It would also encourage strong 
parties to offer a fair settlement in high-probability suits brought 
against them. They would know that there is only a slim chance their 
opponents will cave in and that, if they lose at court, they will have to 
pay not only their own attorney fees but also those of their adversary.  
1.   Expansion of the Market for Legal Services 
 The most noteworthy and laudable probable effect of the general 
progressive fee-shifting rule would be the expansion of the legal ser-
vices market to cover currently excluded types of claims. As discussed 
above, the advent of the contingency fee dramatically changed the lit-
igation landscape in favor of low-income individuals.200 Underlying 
the proposed rule is the same economic logic behind the contingency 
fee, only it works better and in a much wider range of cases than the 
contingency fee. Like the contingency fee, the conditional fee ar-
rangement incorporated into the proposed rule would tap the forces 
of the legal services market by providing high quality lawyers eco-
nomic incentive to accept less wealthy clients on a no-win, no-fee ba-
sis. At the same time, the general progressive rule overcomes the two 
most serious drawbacks of contingency fees. First, in contrast to the 
contingency fee market, which “only functions if there are damages 
from which attorneys can collect fees,”201 the proposed rule detaches 
the amount charged in attorney fees from the size of recovery. Thus, 
it would bring into the legal services market a wide array of cases not 
suited to the contingency arrangement, such as small meritorious 
claims, nonmonetary claims, and cases in which the defendant is the 
                                                                                                                                       
 200. See discussion at supra Part II.B. 
 201. Yeazell, supra note 31, at 709.  
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poor party.202 Second, under the contingency fee system, poor plain-
tiffs are left undercompensated because a large proportion of the re-
covery is siphoned off as attorney fees. By shifting payment of the 
fees (both the basic charge and success fee) to the wealthy party, the 
proposed rule would ensure that the poor party is compensated for 
her entire loss.  
 Fully compensating prevailing poor parties while leaving rich par-
ties undercompensated when they win is justified from an efficiency 
perspective for two reasons. First, there is a great deal of consensus 
amongst law and economics scholars that redistribution of wealth is 
justified not only on egalitarian grounds but also from an efficiency 
standpoint, due to the diminishing marginal utility of money. Indeed, 
“a dollar of income often will raise the utility of some individuals 
more than that of others. Notably, redistributing income from the 
rich to the poor will tend to raise social welfare, assuming that the 
marginal utility of income is greater for the poor than for the rich.”203
Therefore, the wealth transferring effect of the proposed fee-shifting 
rule is, at least up to a certain point, welfare-enhancing.204 The 
second efficiency justification derives from the availability of legal ex-
penses insurance (“LEI”) for rich parties, which protects the insured 
against the costs of bringing or defending legal actions.205 LEI policies 
enable wealthy individuals and middle-sized corporations, who tend 
                                                                                                                                       
 202. This is also the reason why one-way fee shifting in favor of plaintiffs will not 
suffice. John Leubsdorf has proposed awarding fees as damages to prevailing plaintiffs but 
not to prevailing defendants. Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 440. This proposal is inferior to 
the general progressive rule presented here from both distributive justice and efficiency 
perspectives. There are many examples in which the strong party is (or could be) the 
defendant rather than the plaintiff. A few such examples are bank-client cases, landlord-
tenant cases, and subrogated insurance cases. Moreover, the government and large 
corporations are repeat players, and one of the defining characteristics of repeat players is 
their ability to structure their next transaction and reorient the market in any direction 
they want. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 98. They can structure transactions so that they 
will always be the defendant (for instance, by requiring a deposit and then confiscating it 
in the event of a dispute arising, thereby forcing the other party to the transaction to sue in 
order to recover her money) or decide to sue and become the plaintiff. Moreover, there is 
also the problem of the government and large corporations using counterclaims to 
intimidate their adversaries. Thus, structuring a fee award system that prefers only 
plaintiffs or only defendants would inevitably serve the interests of wealthy repeat players 
rather than poor one-shotters. 
 203. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 30 (2002). 
 204. See generally Sanchirico, supra note 170 (arguing that up to a certain point, 
redistributive private law rules are efficient).  
 205. There are two types of LEI—“before-the-event” (“BTE”) and “after-the-event” 
(“ATE”). With BTE insurance, the policy is bought in advance to cover the consequences of 
an event that has yet to occur. ATE insurance policies are purchased after the disputed 
event has already occurred, although the legal expenses resulting from the event have yet 
to be incurred. From the insurer’s standpoint, “the risk of being forced to indemnify the 
insured against legal costs is much higher under . . . ATE” insurance, and consequently, 
ATE premiums are much higher than BTE premiums. Matthias Kilian & Francis Regan, 
Legal Expenses Insurance and Legal Aid—Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Experience 
from Germany and Sweden, 11 INT’L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 233, 235 (2004).        
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not to be repeat players and are thus unable to spread risks over a 
large number of actions, to insure for the risk entailed in litigating 
under the proposed fee-shifting rule. For various reasons,206 LEI is 
much less prevalent in the United States than in England and Con-
tinental Europe.207 It is quite likely, however, that the institution of 
the general progressive rule suggested here would increase the ap-
peal of such insurance for rich individuals and corporations, and in-
surance carriers would then begin to offer these policies.208
2.   The Likelihood of Frivolous Claims 
 Frivolous claims are unmeritorious low-probability lawsuits that 
lead to “wasteful” litigation.209 In the United States, frivolous law-
suits are often, though not always, “brought with the intention of se-
curing settlement from the defendant since the defendant’s unreco-
verable lawyer fees could run higher than the amount the plaintiff 
will accept to settle the case.”210 In exempting litigants from paying 
their opponents’ attorney fees, the American Rule places litigants at 
a far lower financial risk than the English Rule does; thus, frivolous 
claims are more likely to be filed under the former than the latter. 
Extending the same logic, we can argue that the general progressive 
fee-shifting rule proposed here would encourage poor parties to bring 
frivolous lawsuits against rich parties, in knowing that even if they 
lose, they will not have to pay their adversary’s attorney fees and 
thus are taking only a minimal risk. While, admittedly, this concern 
is not unfounded, it is not as grave as it may seem upon first glance. 
To begin with, the overall incidence of frivolous suits in fact would 
not increase under the proposed rule. If anything, it would be quite 
                                                                                                                                       
 206. Not the least of which are the availability of contingency fee arrangements and the 
prohibition on lawyers sharing profits with nonlawyers. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 74. 
 207. Id.; see also Robert A. Hershbarger, Book Review, 43 J. RISK & INS. 349, 350 
(1976) (reviewing WERNER PFENNINGSTORF, LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE: THE EUROPEAN 
EXPERIENCE IN FINANCING LEGAL SERVICES (1975)) (arguing that “[t]he rapid development 
of legal expense insurance in Europe and its sluggish start in the United States are 
attributed primarily to the general absence of contingency fee arrangements [in Europe]”). 
 208. For several reasons, LEI cannot replace legal aid or one-way fee shifting as a 
mechanism for enabling access to justice for low-income people. One reason is the 
insurance policy premiums, which are usually quite high and therefore put the insurance 
out of the reach of people with modest means. Second, all types of insurance policies 
require the occurrence of an “insured event,” which triggers the rights of the insured under 
the policy, including her right to consult a lawyer. Many low-income earners, however, are 
unaware of their legal rights and need general legal advice, which is unavailable under 
most LEI insurance policies. Another inherent limitation of the effectiveness of LEI as a 
mechanism that facilitates access to justice is that all types of insurance policies refuse 
coverage if the insured event is triggered by a willful act on the part of the insured. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the empirical data show that “LEI is taken out to a much 
lesser degree by those with little income.” Kilian & Regan, supra note 205, at 241-43. 
 209. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 26. 
 210. Angela Wennihan, Let’s Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency Fee, 49 SMU
L. REV. 1639, 1658 (1996). 
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the opposite. Under the American Rule, both parties are equally in-
centivized to file frivolous lawsuits, whereas under the general pro-
gressive fee-shifting rule, only the poor party would have incentive to 
file such a lawsuit.  
 More importantly, however, the restructuring of the market in le-
gal services that would follow in the wake of the proposed rule would 
significantly diminish the likelihood of a proliferation of frivolous 
claims. The new fee-shifting rule would generally entitle only people 
of modest means to a fee award—people who cannot self-finance liti-
gation and, therefore, have no alternative to no-win, no-fee arrange-
ments. Since under such arrangements it is lawyers, not their clients, 
who would bear the majority of the risk entailed by the relevant liti-
gation, lawyers would have ample incentive to screen out frivolous 
cases and pursue only cases with a high probability of success. With 
the prospect of a 100% success fee, lawyers would likely accept any 
case with a 51% or more chance of prevailing in court; anything be-
low that would be too risky. In this way, the actual market structure 
would assist in weeding out unmeritorious suits.211
 Lastly, as rightly observed by Deborah Rhode, “what qualifies as a 
frivolous claim generally depends on the eye of the beholder.”212 What 
some may view as extortive, others may see as justified claims. Sex-
ual harassment suits, for instance, were overwhelmingly dismissed 
in the past as frivolous, whereas the vast majority today are consi-
dered meritorious.213 Similarly, large corporations expend great ef-
forts—with considerable success—to characterize consumer claims as 
petty and frivolous in an attempt to rally the public against them and 
convince legislatures to ban them.214 We should, therefore, proceed 
with great caution when labeling a suit as frivolous. 
 However, even if the above analysis is erroneous and the proposed 
rule would in fact result in a greater volume of frivolous lawsuits, as 
Herbert Kritzer aptly put it, a balance must be sought: “In the end, the 
question comes down to the problem of finding a balance between per-
mitting aggrieved parties to have easy access to the courts and deterring 
                                                                                                                                       
 211. This is even more true given the fact that sophisticated finance has come to 
ordinary litigation. There are firms and specialized divisions in commercial banks that 
specialize in the legal services industry. These firms finance litigation based on an 
assessment of each case. This market will be able to sort the good cases from the bad ones. 
See Yeazell, supra note 67, at 204. 
 212. RHODE, supra note 3, at 28. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 26-27; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 451 (“Often, doubts about 
whether a small claim should be litigated reflect critical views of the claim or the litigant who 
asserts it. No one suggests that a bank wastes the time of the courts when it sues a borrower 
who did not pay a two-hundred-dollar loan. A tort claimant may be taken less seriously.”). 
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parties from ‘oversuing’ when their cases are marginal or nonexistent. 
There is . . . no ‘empirically correct’ answer to this dilemma.”215
3.   The Hyperlexis Problem 
 A related, yet nonetheless distinct, issue is the expected effect of a 
general progressive one-way fee-shifting rule on the overall probabili-
ty of litigation. This issue can be considered from two perspectives—
empirical and normative. The empirical question is whether the pro-
posed rule would spawn an increase in the lawsuit volume. If we  
assume it would, then the normative question arises: would this be 
good or bad? There is no clear unequivocal answer to the first  
question. Some scholars argue that such a one-way fee-shifting rule 
would likely increase the overall number of actions filed; small  
meritorious claims, which are not worth pursuing under the Ameri-
can Rule and are too risky under the English Rule, would be filed 
under the proposed fee-shifting rule.216 This common analysis has 
not, however, gone uncontested. Richard Posner, for instance, has ar-
gued that contrary to the conventional view, “one-way indemnity may 
not even generate more litigation than the American (no-indemnity) 
rule does.”217
 Even assuming that Posner is mistaken and the proposed one-way 
fee-shifting rule would increase the volume of claims filed, this would 
not necessarily be a negative effect. In fact, the prospect of more liti-
gation is, in all likelihood, actually a blessing. Belying the vociferous 
grumbling about the so-called “litigation explosion”218 or hyperlexis 
(excessive litigation), many studies have found that it is in fact a 
myth.219 Indeed, the real problem emerges as quite the opposite—not 
enough litigation—which leads to systematic undercompensation of 
victims. Some illustrative statistics, collected from a wide range of 
empirical studies, prove the point:       
[O]nly about 10 percent of accident victims file claims and only 2 to 
3 percent bring lawsuits. So too a review of some 30,000 New York 
                                                                                                                                       
 215. Kritzer, supra note 144, at 138. 
 216. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 449. 
 217. POSNER, supra note 14, at 593.  
218. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); see also RHODE, supra note 3, at 26-27 
(portraying the dominating public discourse concerning the over-litigiousness of American 
society); Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 261, 280-81 (2009) (describing the historical transformation 
from a concern about access to justice to a concern about the litigation explosion).  
 219. See generally, Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (arguing that the litigation explosion 
lacks empirical grounding); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD.
L. REV. 3, 5, 37-39 (1986) (using empirical analysis of litigation filing rates to challenge the 
conception of a litigation explosion). 
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hospital records disclosed that only about 12 percent of patients who 
sustained injuries from negligent medical care brought malpractice 
actions and only half of those received compensation. Other research 
on medical malpractice cases has found that plaintiffs on average 
recovered just over half their costs and those with the most severe 
injuries ended up with only a third. Similar patterns of undercom-
pensation hold for victims of unsafe products and of automobile and 
airline accidents. The tort liability system reimburses only about 4 
percent of victims’ direct costs of accidental injuries.220
 This predicament is not only plainly unfair to victims but also has 
a negative impact on the system’s overall efficiency in that it distorts 
the substantive behavior incentives for potential tortfeasors and 
wrongdoers. Under both the American and English Rules, potential 
wrongdoers (which are often large entities such as government bodies 
or large corporations) know that the risk of being sued for violations 
of substantive norms is quite slim. Thus, they have no incentive to 
refrain from wrongful conduct or take adequate precautions against 
the risks they create.221 As explained, the proposed general progres-
sive rule would encourage weak parties to file and aggressively liti-
gate claims (even for small monetary damages and nonmonetary 
harms) when they have been unjustly wronged, forcing powerful and 
wealthy parties to internalize the costs of their wrongdoings.  
 Therefore, the supposed inefficiency of pursuing small meritorious 
claims, which are worth less than the social cost of litigating them, is 
an illusion. It is in fact a mistake to compare the costs of litigating a 
specific claim (which includes both the parties’ expenses and what 
society spends on the judicial proceedings) with the monetary value 
of that claim. The public benefit of challenging unlawful conduct per-
petrated by the government or a large corporation is not manifested 
solely in the individual stake of one particular litigant. Therefore, the 
proposed general progressive rule, in increasing the overall feasibility 
and probability of litigation (particularly of small claims), would not 
lead to a waste of social resources.222 Indeed, “[t]he feasibility of such 
suits would in all likelihood . . . deter[] the defendant from commit-
ting the wrongful act in the first place.”223
4.   Impact on Settlements 
 Since most civil cases are settled rather than tried, the potential 
effect of the general progressive rule on settlement is a crucial com-
ponent in its assessment. Unfortunately, what effect fee shifting in 
general has on the likelihood of settlement is rather uncertain and 
                                                                                                                                       
 220. RHODE, supra note 3, at 31. 
 221. See Katz, supra note 188, at 76. 
 222. See Krent, supra note 14, at 2052. 
 223. POSNER, supra note 14, at 587.  
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subject to debate. The conventional wisdom is that two-way fee shift-
ing leads to a lower settlement rate because it reinforces the effects of 
differences of opinion between parties to litigation regarding the 
possible outcome of the trial. People usually pursue litigation because 
they are overly optimistic about their chances at trial, which causes 
them to underestimate the chances that they will have to pay their 
adversary’s attorney fees and overestimate their chances of being 
reimbursed for their own attorney fees. As a result, the likelihood of 
settlement being reached decreases and the likelihood of going to tri-
al correspondingly increases.224 Some, however, dispute this conven-
tional wisdom, asserting that fee shifting actually increases the like-
lihood of the parties reaching a settlement. They reason that the 
greater expenses parties are likely to incur under the English Rule 
could counterbalance parties’ tendency to prefer litigation as pre-
dicted under the optimism model and, therefore, increase the likelih-
ood of settlement.225 There are also those who turn to the Coase 
Theorem to demonstrate that the settlement rate is unaffected by fee 
shifting, remaining identical under both the English and the Ameri-
can Rules.226 Thus, the only conclusion to be garnered from the scho-
larly literature is that the effects of fee shifting on the settlement 
rate are ambiguous at best.227
 It is important to recall, however, that settlements are not benefi-
cial in and of themselves. They are beneficial only to the extent that 
they serve the goals underlying the civil justice system, which in-
clude not only efficiency but also equality and fairness. In all proba-
bility, the implementation of the rule proposed in this Article would 
serve these goals better than any alternative rule, even if accompa-
nied by a slight decrease in the likelihood of settlement. Under both 
the American and the English Rules, strong parties such as the gov-
ernment and big business are in a position to force unfairly low (or 
even no) settlements on average-income legal adversaries. Due to the 
fact that strong parties possess far greater litigation resources than 
their weaker adversaries, under the American Rule they are able to 
                                                                                                                                       
 224. Hughes & Snyder, supra note 191, at 231; see also SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 456. 
 225. See, e.g., John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I’ll be Suing 
You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 175-76 (1989); Roger Bowles, Settlement Range and Cost 
Allocation Rules, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177 (1987); Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, 
Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental 
Evidence, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 169-76 (1988) (finding through empirical studies 
that the English Rule produces more settlements than the American Rule, suggesting that 
the higher risk of paying the adversary’s costs encourages settlements).  
 226. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell 
Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104  HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1099 (1991).   
 227. Katz, supra note 188, at 73. The same theoretical uncertainty and ambiguity that 
surround the effects of the English Rule (namely, two-way fee shifting) on settlement holds 
also for the likely impact of one-way fee shifting on settlements. See Leubsdorf, supra note 
178, at 456-58; see also Krent, supra note 14, at 2079-82. 
2010]                     JUST FEE SHIFTING 763 
wrest settlements favorable to them but unjust to their opponents. 
They do this by threatening to drag their opponents into expensive 
protracted litigation, which they would be unable to finance without 
fee shifting. Weaker parties fare no better under the English Rule. 
When parties assume full risk of bearing their adversary’s fees, 
stronger parties can safely make a low settlement offer or even refuse 
to make any offer knowing that their weaker opponent will prefer to 
accept the offer or withdraw its claim rather than run the risk of a 
costs award. By minimizing the advantage that the government and 
large corporations often enjoy in litigation against smaller adversa-
ries, the proposed general progressive rule would bolster the bargain-
ing position of weaker parties and make them far less vulnerable to 
undue pressure. The weaker party is shielded from the risk of paying 
its stronger opponent’s fees while the latter is exposed to that risk, 
thereby positioning the weaker party to reject unjustly low settle-
ment offers and credibly threaten its opponent with the prospect of 
continuing to trial.  
B.   The Argument from (Horizontal) Fairness 
 Having established the desirability of the general progressive rule 
from both distributive and efficiency perspectives, it must now be ad-
dressed from a fairness perspective. Under the fairness argument, 
randomness and limited participation could be invoked as reasons for 
rejecting the proposed rule in favor of a more comprehensive redistri-
butive scheme. Advocates of the fairness argument would admit that 
the poor are entitled to equal access to the civil justice system, just as 
they deserve a quality education and affordable health care. Howev-
er, these are all social obligations that should be borne by the state as 
the representative of society at large. It would be unfair to require 
only a selection of the broad group of those who should participate in 
the ideal comprehensive redistributive scheme to bear its costs.228
Therefore, the argument goes, the rules governing attorney fees 
should apply to all people equally, irrespective of wealth, and equal 
access to justice should be guaranteed through overarching govern-
mental schemes such as legal aid and the tax and transfer system. 
 The fairness argument should not be taken lightly. It has led the 
majority of federal courts to narrowly interpret the discretion Rule 
54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants to judges to de-
cide whether to award costs (other than attorney fees) to a prevailing 
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party.229 While the jurisprudence of a small number of these courts 
encourages judges to consider relative financial status in awarding 
costs,230 the majority of the federal courts take the view that this 
practice should be rejected as “fundamentally unfair to wealthy liti-
gants.”231 In Smith v. Southern Pennsylvania Transportation Authori-
ty,232 for instance, the court rejected the argument that it would be 
inequitable to award costs to a prevailing party when the losing party 
is of substantially lesser wealth, holding that “[a]cceptance of this 
general proposition would mean that large institutions . . . could be 
denied costs in most cases even when their unsuccessful adversaries 
could well afford to pay for them. In this instance this would be un-
fair to those who must ultimately bear the burden of . . . costs . . . .”233
 Yet, for several reasons, the fairness argument is ultimately un-
persuasive. First, in order to seriously challenge the proposed general 
progressive rule on fairness grounds, it is essential to offer alterna-
tives that are able to achieve similar results, both in terms of effi-
ciency and redistribution, and at the same time be fairer to the rich. 
In fact, the proposed rule is superior to the alternatives that its po-
tential opponents could present in every aspect. Neither legal aid nor 
the tax and transfer system can bring about an expansion of the 
market the way and at the cost that the proposed rule could; indeed, 
far more public funds would be required to achieve the same results. 
Moreover, the proposed rule is superior to alternative redistributive 
schemes from the expressive perspective as well, insofar as the social 
meaning of the redistribution is concerned. One of the problems of 
publicly-funded programs such as legal aid and the tax system is that 
they are often depicted as acts of charity by the productive towards 
the unproductive.234 In contrast, the general progressive fee-shifting 
rule is based on a notion of entitlement, not charity. Therefore, this 
rule would be likely to empower the disadvantaged, assist them in at-
taining such objective goods as self–respect, and enhance their ap-
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preciation of the money that they have received. At the same time, 
the rule would decrease the giver’s opposition to the redistribution 
and injury to her welfare.235
 Second, even assuming arguendo that legal aid and the tax system 
are superior regimes to the proposed rule on all counts (efficiency, 
distribution, expressivity, and fairness), they are still not enough. A 
serious critique cannot make do with simply showing the mere exis-
tence of hypothetical alternatives. Rather, it is necessary to show 
some likelihood of these other mechanisms being used.236 It is quite 
clear that the chances of the government spending more money on 
legal aid programs or engaging in a massive redistribution through 
the tax and transfer system are not just slim but practically nil.237
Consequently, these are virtual rather than real alternatives.  
 Third, the problem of limited participation would be a compelling 
argument only if the proposed rule creates a redistribution that plac-
es its rich participants in a worse position than they would have oc-
cupied had an ideal redistribution transpired. So long as the rich who 
do participate in the redistribution do not bear more than their fair 
share, the fact that not all those who should have participated actual-
ly participate does not amount to sufficient reason to relieve the for-
mer of their obligation to participate. In other words, partial redistri-
bution is fairer than no redistribution at all.238 At present, it is pa-
tently clear that society is so far removed from an adequate distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens that the participation argument fails to 
absolve the rich from their duty to take part in the redistribution, 
even if it is far from being comprehensive. 
 Lastly, but most importantly, the proposed fee-shifting rule would 
not result in random redistribution, at least not as grossly as it may 
appear upon first glance. In fact, under the proposed rule, all wealthy 
entities and many moneyed individuals would participate in the re-
distribution in one way or another. To begin with, it is hard to im-
agine any institutional entity that does not engage in litigation on a 
regular basis. Most such entities (including the government, large 
private firms, financial institutions, and insurance companies) are 
repeat players who bring and defend claims on a daily basis. Thus, 
the proposed rule is not random at all in effect but is in fact quite 
systematic and progressive. On average, the richer the institutional 
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entity, the more likely it is to engage in litigation and, thus, to par-
ticipate in the redistributive scheme. This is less applicable to indi-
viduals, but their relative weight in the redistributive scheme is less 
significant in any event. Second, the availability of legal expenses in-
surance (LEI) would enable broad participation in the redistributive 
scheme. As discussed above, one of the outcomes of the proposed rule 
would be a considerable rise in the demand for LEI among the  
wealthy. Insurance is a loss-spreading mechanism. Widespread use 
of this mechanism would mean that, rather than a few entities and 
individuals suffering great losses, many entities and individuals 
would incur small and predictable losses over time, which would be 
reflected in the insurance premiums. Thus, LEI would remedy any 
problem of partiality or randomness of participation. The costs of the 
redistribution would be spread equally across the insured, which 
would likely be the entire class of the rich, and thus result in hori-
zontal equity.239
V.   CONCLUSION
 Serving more than one master is a daunting task.240 The proposed 
general progressive one-way fee-shifting rule, however, could carry 
this off quite successfully. Indeed, the rule should find appeal with all 
regardless of ideological bent. Advocates of a more egalitarian society 
should support the rule for its progressive characteristics and distri-
butional sensitivity. Avowed conservatives, who firmly believe in the 
free market and minimal state intervention, should also rally behind 
the rule for its ability to promote overall social welfare and efficiency. 
While some could see it as a first step in the long journey towards 
making procedure more redistributive, others could view it as an iso-
lated instance of intervention aimed at correcting specific market 
failures. All the masters would be satisfied.  
 The failure of the civil justice system to provide access, let alone 
equal access, to justice to an ever-growing part of the population has 
been of great concern for quite some time. Many a solution has been 
proposed and attempted in the past, with varying degrees of success. 
If there is one lesson to be learned from past experience, it is that the 
most successful solutions are those that do not depend on public 
funds for their operation. Time and again, the government has been 
called upon to spend more money on legal aid, but to no avail. Look-
ing into the future, it is difficult to imagine that the government will 
make ensuring adequate representation for the poor in civil litigation 
a priority.  
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 If we do wish to make equal access to justice a reality, we must re-
ly on the market rather than the government and design market-
driven mechanisms to assist the poor. Such mechanisms already ex-
ist; one example is the contingency fee, another is class actions. De-
spite the apparent differences between the two, these mechanisms 
share one thing in common: they both channel market forces to the 
benefit of the disadvantaged. They created a market in legal services 
where none existed before. With this insight in mind, the proposed 
fee-shifting rule seeks to follow in their footsteps. It identifies a gap 
in the market, which is covered by neither contingency fees nor class 
actions, and attempts to fill it. To be sure, the proposed progressive 
one-way fee-shifting mechanism is not intended to replace contingen-
cy fee arrangements. It would be applied only in cases of a gross re-
source imbalance between the parties. Contingency fees would be re-
tained for cases in which there is no such imbalance to enable access 
to justice when both parties are equally equipped (or ill-equipped).  
 Almost a quarter of a century ago, John Leubsdorf made the fol-
lowing optimistic observation: “The message of the [Equal Access to 
Justice] Act may be that Congress is now willing to award fees to a 
relatively poor party who prevails [in litigation] against a wealthy in-
stitutional litigant.”241 Thus far, this prediction has yet to material-
ize. Adopting the proposed general progressive fee-shifting rule, how-
ever, could turn this vision into a reality.  
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